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THE OVER-ENCUMBERED TRADE-IN IN CHAPTER 13 
Nathan Goralnik∗ 
ABSTRACT 
The “hanging paragraph” in Bankruptcy Code § 1325(a) requires many 
debtors hoping to retain a vehicle under a chapter 13 plan to repay the full 
value of their auto lender’s secured claim, even if that claim is undersecured. 
This protection is limited to creditors with a purchase-money security interest 
in the debtor’s vehicle. Accordingly, bankruptcy courts reviewing a chapter 13 
plan must consider the validity of an objecting creditor’s purchase-money 
security interest. This issue has proven controversial in cases where the lender 
financed both the debtor’s newly purchased vehicle and excess debt (“negative 
equity”) a trade-in vehicle. The highly general language of the Uniform 
Commercial Code affords few clues to the purchase-money status of financed 
negative equity. To break the impasse, this Article draws on heretofore-
neglected evidence from the UCC’s text and drafting history that lends 
substance to the “consumer compromise” embodied in Revised Article 9. 
These materials indicate that the UCC maintains strict requirements for 
according purchase-money status to a consumer loan, and would not accord 
purchase-money status to financed negative equity. If this conclusion is at odds 
with the expectations of the drafters of the hanging paragraph, it suggests that 
they erred in hinging the applicability of a rule of federal bankruptcy law on a 
loan’s purchase-money status under state law. 
  
 
 ∗ Associate, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP; J.D., Yale Law School, 2012. This Article has 
benefited from Eric Brunstad’s generous support and inimitable teaching, and from the inspired efforts of the 
Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal’s staff. I owe special thanks to Steve Ferketic for his commitment to 
this project.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Among the important changes wrought by the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”) was to make it 
more expensive for debtors to retain a personal vehicle in chapter 13. 
Previously, a debtor could “bifurcate” her auto loan under § 506 of the 
Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”), which provides that a lien creditor has a 
secured claim only to the extent of the collateral’s replacement value; any 
deficiency is unsecured.1 Accordingly, a chapter 13 debtor could “cram down” 
a plan allowing her to retain her vehicle without repaying the full balance of 
her car loan.2 Since cars depreciate rapidly once driven off the dealer’s lot,3 
bifurcation often left auto lenders undersecured and exposed to significant 
losses in chapter 13.4 In response, BAPCPA amended chapter 13’s 
 
 1 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2006) (a lien holder’s allowed claim is secured to the extent of the collateral’s 
replacement value). 
 2 Id. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (permitting confirmation if “the value . . . distributed under the plan . . . is not 
less than the allowed amount of such claim”). 
 3 See H.R. REP. NO. 106-123, pt. 1, at 128 (1999) (“Even though the vehicle is one day old, the amount 
of the secured creditor’s claim is, under current law, limited to the value of the automobile taking into account 
the immediate effect of depreciation upon purchase.”); see also Sumit Agarwal et al., Asymmetric Information 
and the Automobile Loan Market 14 (Am. Econ. Ass’n, Conf. Paper, 2005) (“Given the significant 
depreciation in auto values upon purchase, many borrowers have an auto loan balance greater than the current 
car value.”). 
 4 See William C. Whitford, A History of the Automobile Lender Provisions of BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 143, 146 (2007). Moreover, the applicable discount rate “could be far to the south of the interest rate 
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confirmation requirements to prevent many debtors from stripping down their 
car loans under § 506.5 However, the text and history of the new provision 
leave considerable uncertainty around the precise obligations of a chapter 13 
debtor seeking to retain a vehicle over her auto lender’s objection. 
Lawmakers proposed a number of measures to protect consumer lenders 
from cramdown during the drafting of BAPCPA.6 The first House bills 
introduced in 1997 and 1998 would have protected both the principal balance 
and the contract interest rate from cramdown in an individual case under any 
Code chapter to the extent that the claim was attributable to a purchase-money 
loan for personal property acquired within 180 days of filing.7 A competing 
Senate draft contained two significant anti-cramdown provisions. The first was 
similar to the House proposal, but incorporated a shorter, ninety-day lookback 
period.8 A second provision, added on behalf of the automobile finance 
industry,9 would have prohibited bifurcation altogether in chapter 13 cases.10 A 
later Senate draft, also applicable to chapter 13, would have precluded 
bifurcation of any claim for a personal automobile loan incurred within five 
years of bankruptcy.11 
 
agreed to by the debtor in the security agreement.” David Gray Carlson, Cars and Homes in Chapter 13 After 
the 2005 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 301, 340 (2006). 
 5 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 306(b), 119 
Stat. 23, 80 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006)) (“[S]ection 506 shall not apply to a[n 
allowed] claim . . . if the creditor has a purchase money security interest securing the debt that is the subject of 
the claim, the debt was incurred within the 910-day [period] preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and 
the collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle . . . acquired for the personal use of the debtor . . . .”). 
 6 For the legislative history of BAPCPA’s automobile-lending provisions, see In re Hayes, 376 B.R. 
655, 675 n.29 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007); Whitford, supra note 4, at 164–86. For the general legislative history 
of BAPCPA, see generally Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (2005). 
 7 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 128 (1998); Responsible Borrower 
Protection Bankruptcy Act, H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. § 110 (1997). 
 8 Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, S. 1301, 105th Cong. § 302(c) (as reported by S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, June 4, 1998); see S. REP. No. 105-253, at 32 (1998). 
 9 See Whitford, supra note 4, at 177 (citing Harry Stoffer, Lobbyists Push Industry’s Problems with 
‘Cramdown’ into the Spotlight, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Oct. 26, 1998, at 28). 
 10 S. 1301, § 302(a) (providing that § 506 shall not apply to “an allowed claim . . . that is secured . . . by 
reason of a lien on property”); see S. REP. No. 105-253, at 33. 
 11 S. REP. NO. 106-49, at 224 (1999) (“[S]ection 506 shall not apply to a[n allowed] claim . . . if the 
debt . . . was incurred within the 5-year period preceding the filing of the petition and the collateral for that 
debt consists of a motor vehicle . . . acquired for the personal use of the debtor . . . .”). 
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The narrower language ultimately adopted emerged in a 2001 draft 
provision entitled “Restoring the Foundation for Secured Credit.”12 Finally 
enacted as an unnumbered “hanging paragraph” following Code § 1325(a), it 
provided that in the context of cramdown in chapter 13, 
section 506 shall not apply to a[n allowed] claim . . . if the creditor 
has a purchase money security interest securing the debt that is the 
subject of the claim, the debt was incurred within the 910-day 
[period] preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and the 
collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle . . . acquired for the 
personal use of the debtor.13 
Courts have interpreted the hanging paragraph as preventing a chapter 13 
debtor from bifurcating a purchase-money loan for a personal vehicle incurred 
within 910 days of bankruptcy.14 Yet this language, described by scholars as 
“most peculiar”15 and even “bizarre,”16 has generated “confusion and 
incoherence in the law.”17 A casual reading of the hanging paragraph unearths 
a tangle of errors, ambiguities, and caveats.18 For example, even the core 
 
 12 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 306(b) 
(2002) (as reported by H. Comm. On the Judiciary, Feb. 26, 2001); see H.R. REP. NO. 107-617, at 210 (2002) 
(Conf. Rep.). 
 13 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 306(b), 119 
Stat. 23, 80 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006)). For other types of purchase-money 
collateral, the hanging paragraph precludes application of § 506 “if the debt was incurred during the 1-year 
period preceding [the bankruptcy] filing.” Id. 
 14 See, e.g., In re Pruitt, 401 B.R. 546, 562 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2009) (“[A] debtor who proposes in her 
Chapter 13 plan to retain a 910–Vehicle pursuant to 1325(a)(5)(B) may not engage in Cram–Down, but rather, 
in order to fully satisfy the 910–Vehicle Claim, must now pay the present value of the entire, deemed unitary 
claim, not just the actually secured component of that claim, as might otherwise have been characterized under 
Section 506.”). 
 15 Carlson, supra note 4, at 340. 
 16 Jean Braucher, Rash and Ride-Through Redux: The Terms for Holding on to Cars, Homes and Other 
Collateral Under the 2005 Act, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 457, 472 (2005). 
 17 AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Long (In re Long), 519 F.3d 288, 292 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 18 For example, one immediately notices that the statute is difficult to cite: its scriveners omitted an 
alphanumeric designation. Dianne C. Kerns, Cram-A-Lot: The Quest Continues, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 
2005, at 10. Additionally, Congress inexplicably adopted the 910-day (2.5-year) lookback provision as a 
“compromise” between proposals containing three- and five-year periods. Whitford, supra note 4 at 184; H.R. 
REP. NO. 107-617, at 210 (2002) (Conf. Rep.). The “910-day” language required a subsequent technical 
amendment to insert the missing word “period.” Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-327, § 2(a)(44)(A), 124 Stat. 3557, 3562 (2010) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(a) (West 
2010)). These errors are far from the only problems evident in the hanging paragraph’s drafting. For further 
discussion, see Jean Braucher, A Guide to Interpretation of the 2005 Bankruptcy Law, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 349, 401–11 (2008); Braucher, supra note 16, at 469–74; Carlson, supra note 4, at 340–70; Kerns, supra 
note 18; Whitford, supra note 4, at 150–51. 
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“section 506 shall not apply” language, which Congress apparently believed 
“would prohibit ‘cramdowns’”19 or operate as “a prohibition against 
bifurcati[on],”20 presents a conundrum. Section 506 does more than provide for 
the bifurcation of secured claims: it governs the very determination of secured 
status.21 Thus, instead of bolstering the automobile creditor’s security, a literal 
reading of “section 506 shall not apply” might remove statutory recognition of 
the creditor’s secured claim.22 This absurd result is foreclosed by the statute’s 
anti-cramdown purpose, which is plain in the legislative history,23 but one 
scholar has commented that “[n]othing could be less plain” in the text itself.24 
This Article confronts a still more confounding ambiguity that has 
produced profound splits among the courts: the hanging paragraph’s 
application to only those creditors with a “purchase money security interest.”25 
This phrase, which is undefined in the Code, generally refers to an interest 
securing “an obligation . . . incurred as all or part of the price of the collateral 
or for value given to enable the debtor to acquire . . . the collateral.”26 Under 
 
 19 S. REP. NO. 105-253, at 33 (1998). 
 20 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 17 (2005). 
 21 See 11 U.S.C. 506 (2006). 
 22 In re Long, 519 F.3d at 293 (“It may be argued that literally, without section 506, there cannot be an 
‘allowed secured claim’ at all under § 1325(a)(5).”). For discussion, see Carlson, supra note 4, at 344–48. 
 23 See supra notes 6–12. 
 24 Braucher, supra note 18, at 401. A further peculiarity is that, in withholding bifurcation under § 506, 
the hanging paragraph protects only the value of the secured claim from cramdown. See generally Till v. SCS 
Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 474 (2004) (“The challenge for bankruptcy courts . . . is to choose an interest rate 
sufficient to compensate the creditor . . . .”). Even under the hanging paragraph, “[t]he time of payment and the 
amount of interest,” for example, “need not conform to the original security agreement. Rather, a (presumably 
lower) cram down interest rate may be imposed on the car lender.” Carlson, supra note 4, at 342. Earlier anti-
cramdown proposals avoided this difficulty by clearly providing that “the amount of the allowed secured claim 
shall be the sum of the unpaid principal balance . . . and accrued and unpaid interest and charges at the contract 
rate.” Responsible Borrower Protection Bankruptcy Act, H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. § 110 (1997). This proposal 
further provided that in the case of commingled collateral, “the amount of the allowed secured claim shall be 
not less than the unpaid principal balance of the purchase price of the personal property acquired and unpaid 
interest and charges at the contract rate.” Id. Yet the silence of the hanging paragraph’s enacted language 
seemingly leaves the applicable interest rate to the court’s discretion, thus affording less than full protection to 
auto lenders. 
 25 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a). 
 26 U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(2) (2011). Official Comment 3 adds: 
As used in subsection (a)(2), the definition of “purchase-money obligation,” the “price” of 
collateral or the “value given to enable” includes obligations for expenses incurred in connection 
with acquiring rights in the collateral, sales taxes, duties, finance charges, interest, freight 
charges, costs of storage in transit, demurrage, administrative charges, expenses of collection and 
enforcement, attorney’s fees, and other similar obligations. 
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the Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”), a vendor selling a particular good 
on credit may acquire a purchase-money security interest in the good that is 
senior to a more general advance of funds that merely names the good as 
collateral.27 Courts applying the hanging paragraph have had to consider 
whether an auto lender holds a valid purchase-money security interest where 
the loan financed not only the sticker price of the car, but also additional items 
such as gap insurance,28 extended warranties,29 servicing contracts,30 cash 
advances,31 and antecedent car loans.32  
The “most complex” of these problems relates to trade-in transactions.33 
Because many car buyers have negative equity in their trade-in vehicle (they 
owe more than the car is worth), they frequently require financing for the 
negative equity in the trade-in, in addition to the newly purchased vehicle.34 
For example, a buyer might owe $8,000 on an existing vehicle worth $5,000. If 
she seeks to trade in her car for another vehicle priced at $18,000, she may 
need to finance both the $18,000 purchase price and the $3,000 in excess debt 
on the trade-in. In such a common situation, it is far from clear that sums 
advanced to retire the lien on the trade-in constitute “purchase money,” and the 
hanging paragraph’s legislative history leaves “no indication Congress gave 
 
U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3. Additionally, a “‘purchase-money security interest’ requires a close nexus between the 
acquisition of collateral and the secured obligation. Thus, a security interest does not qualify as a purchase-
money security interest if a debtor acquires property on unsecured credit and subsequently creates the security 
interest to secure the purchase price.” Id. 
 27 U.C.C. § 9-324(a). For historical background on the development of this seniority, see generally Grant 
Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (1963). 
 28 Compare Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dale (In re Dale), 582 F.3d 568, 575 (5th Cir. 2009) (extending the 
hanging paragraph’s protection to financed gap insurance), with In re Munzberg, 388 B.R. 529, 548 (Bankr. D. 
Vt. 2008) (bifurcating the portion of an auto loan attributable to the purchase of gap insurance). 
 29 Compare In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 575 (extending the hanging paragraph’s protection to financed 
extended warranties), with In re White, 352 B.R. 633, 639–40 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2006) (denying application of 
the hanging paragraph to a financed extended warranty). 
 30 Compare In re Munzberg, 388 B.R. at 544 (extending the hanging paragraph’s protection to a financed 
service contract), with GMAC v. Horne, 390 B.R. 191, 205–06 (E.D. Va. 2008) (denying application of the 
hanging paragraph to financed service contracts), aff’d in part, 394 F. App’x 13 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 31 In re Horn, 338 B.R. 110, 113–14 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2006) (holding that the hanging paragraph does 
not protect additional cash advances). 
 32 In re Vega, 344 B.R. 616, 621–22 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006) (holding that the hanging paragraph does not 
protect value given to refinance a buyer’s other vehicles). 
 33 Braucher, supra note 18, at 407. 
 34 Jim Henry, Credit’s Easing for Auto Customers, Data Show, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (July 27, 2011, 
10:24 AM), http://www.autonews.com/article/20110727/FINANCE_AND_INSURANCE/110729878/1142. 
More than one-fifth of trade-in vehicles were “upside down” in June 2011. Id. 
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the negative equity issue any thought at all.”35 This conundrum forms the 
subject of this Article. 
Part I begins by surveying existing approaches to the treatment of financed 
negative equity under the hanging paragraph. Whether a car loan that rolls in 
negative equity from an over-encumbered trade-in enjoys the protection of the 
hanging paragraph has divided the courts and generated an unresolved split 
among the circuits.36 The case law has primarily looked to UCC § 9-103(a)(2) 
and its accompanying Official Comment 3 for guidance.37 Yet, as Part II 
argues, these provisions are too general to furnish a satisfying argument for 
either position on the purchase-money status of negative equity. This Article 
charts a different approach. Drawing on heretofore neglected evidence from 
the text and drafting history § 9-103, I argue that the definition of purchase-
money obligations remains highly restrictive in the context of consumer-goods 
transactions such as the sale of a vehicle, and excludes financed negative 
equity from purchase-money status. 
If sums advanced to finance negative equity are not purchase money, a 
further question concerns whether a purchase-money security interest survives 
in the remainder of the loan. In some jurisdictions, the “transformation” rule 
denies purchase-money status to the entirety of a loan with a non-purchase-
money component.38 But in other jurisdictions, the less severe “dual-status” 
rule provides that such a loan remains a purchase-money obligation to the 
extent that it finances the new vehicle’s sticker price and related expenses.39 
Because the dual-status rule contemplates a car loan having purchase-money 
and non-purchase-money components, the precise application of the hanging 
paragraph to such loans is not straightforward.40  
 
 35 Braucher, supra note 18, at 407–08. 
 36 See infra Part I. For an earlier survey of this case law, see Geoffrey M. Collins, Note, Negative Equity 
and Purchase-Money Security Interests Under the Uniform Commercial Code and the BAPCPA, 95 CORNELL 
L. REV. 161, 175 tbl. (2009); see also Juliet M. Moringiello, (Mis)use of State Law in Bankruptcy: The 
Hanging Paragraph Story, WISC. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 972–82), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2032078. 
 37 See U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(2) & cmt.3 (2011). 
 38 See infra notes 79–81, 233–36. For background on the transformation rule, see generally Mary 
Aronov, The Transformation Rule Applied to Purchase Money Security Interests in Commercial Lending 
Transactions, 16 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 15 (1985). 
 39 See infra notes 66–77. 
 40 See U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 7(a) (explaining that, under the dual-status rule, “a security interest may be a 
purchase-money security interest to some extent and a non-purchase-money security interest to some extent”). 
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Against this background, Part III makes an uneasy case for according 
negative-equity loans partial protection from bifurcation—that is, the hanging 
paragraph protects the purchase-money component from bifurcation, but not 
the sums used to finance negative equity. Ironically, while the UCC controls 
the definition of “purchase money,” the purchase-money status of a consumer 
auto loan has far greater federal- than state-law consequences under existing 
law. Thus, there is a practical logic to the courts’ tendency to stretch the state-
law concept of purchase money to provide auto lenders with greater protection 
under federal bankruptcy law. Nevertheless, this approach risks upsetting the 
delicate structure of the purchase-money priority, just as withholding such 
protection would frustrate the hanging paragraph’s purpose to enhance the 
rights of undersecured auto lenders. The merit of the dual-status approach is 
that it furthers Congress’s apparent intent to the extent consistent with a 
coherent interpretation of the underlying state law. 
I. NEGATIVE EQUITY UNDER THE HANGING PARAGRAPH: THREE 
APPROACHES 
The interpretive puzzles posed by the hanging paragraph and its reference 
to purchase-money security interests involve a vital issue for many going 
through bankruptcy: how much will they have to pay their auto lender to retain 
their vehicle under a chapter 13 plan? A bankruptcy court may confirm a plan 
over the objection of a secured creditor if “the value . . . to be distributed under 
the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such 
claim.”41 Under Code § 506, this amount is generally limited to the 
replacement value of the collateral securing the debt,42 meaning that a debtor 
frequently does not need to make a secured creditor whole to retain the 
encumbered property. However, the hanging paragraph imposes more onerous 
requirements in the case of auto loans: it provides that “section 506 shall not 
apply” to claims for debt backed by a “purchase money security interest” in a 
personal motor vehicle and incurred within 910 days of the bankruptcy filing.43 
Thus, a debtor hoping to cram down a chapter 13 plan over the objection of her 
 
 41 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 42 Id. § 506(a)(2). 
 43 Id. § 1325(a). The statute withholds application of § 506 for other purchase-money loans incurred 
within one year of the bankruptcy filing. Id. 
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auto lender must presumably repay the full value of the debt, even if her 
vehicle is worth far less.44 
The hanging paragraph’s exclusive application to creditors holding a 
purchase-money security interest in the debtor’s vehicle has generated 
disagreement over the extent to which auto loans that finance negative trade-in 
equity are immune from bifurcation. First, courts have differed over whether 
funds used to retire negative equity give rise to purchase-money obligations or 
ordinary secured loans under the UCC. Second, the jurisdictions that have not 
regarded negative-equity financing as purchase money have divided over 
whether a loan that includes both purchase money (i.e., the financing for the 
new vehicle) and non-purchase money (i.e., the financing for negative trade-in 
equity) loses its purchase-money status in toto or only pro tanto. These 
disagreements have given rise to three broad approaches to the treatment of 
negative trade-in equity.45 
The most popular approach holds that the hanging paragraph protects the 
entire auto loan from bifurcation. Eight circuits have taken this position, 
construing the laws of Georgia,46 Illinois,47 Kansas,48 Missouri,49 New York,50 
North Carolina,51 Ohio,52 Texas,53 and Virginia.54 Lower courts have reached 
 
 44 To be sure, the hanging paragraph does not explain what, other than the replacement value of the 
collateral, would govern the valuation of the auto lender’s secured claim. See supra text accompanying notes 
19–22. However, the hanging paragraph has been interpreted to render eligible claims “immune from 
cramdown and bifurcation of their full security interest in [debtors’] cars, including that portion deriving from 
the negative trade-in value of their prior cars.” Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 585 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 
2009). 
 45 For a concise review of these positions, see In re Van Dyke, No. 08-82866, 2009 WL 5206449, at *2 
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2009). 
 46 See Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 47 See Howard v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. (In re Howard), 597 F.3d 852, 858 (7th Cir. 2010); In re Van 
Dyke, 2009 WL 5206449, at *4 (following In re Whipple); In re Whipple, 417 B.R. 86, 96 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 
2009); In re Smith, 401 B.R. 343, 355 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2008). 
 48 See Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1286 (10th Cir. 2009); AmeriCredit 
Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Padgett (In re Padgett), 408 B.R. 374, 381 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2009) (decided prior to In re 
Ford). 
 49 See Nuvell Credit Co. v. Callicott (In re Callicott), 580 F.3d 753, 754 (8th Cir. 2009) (following In re 
Mierkowski); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 2009); In 
re Weiser, 381 B.R. 263, 271 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2007). 
 50 See Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 585 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 51 See Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 627–28 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 52 See Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 503 (6th Cir. 2010); In re Riley, 
428 B.R. 757, 763 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010); In re Hampton, No. 07-14990, 2008 WL 5749718, at *4 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ohio June 16, 2008). 
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the same result in Alabama,55 Florida,56 Indiana,57 Michigan,58 Pennsylvania,59 
South Carolina,60 Utah,61 Vermont,62 and Wisconsin.63 While these decisions 
primarily interpret the definition of purchase-money obligations in UCC § 9-
103(a)(2), a number of authorities have cited state automobile-finance statutes 
or relied on federal authority for additional support.64 The Eleventh Circuit’s 
seminal opinion in In re Graupner incorporates all three methods.65 
The second view denies purchase-money status to the portion of an auto 
loan used to finance the negative trade-in equity, but holds that the hanging 
paragraph nevertheless applies to the remaining purchase-money component of 
the loan. A Ninth Circuit bankruptcy appellate panel took this “dual-status” 
approach in In re Penrod.66 Lower courts in Alaska,67 Colorado,68 Indiana,69 
Kentucky,70 Mississippi,71 Oregon,72 Pennsylvania,73 Tennessee,74 
 
 53 See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dale (In re Dale), 582 F.3d 568, 575 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 54 See GMAC v. Horne, 394 F. App’x 13 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
 55 See In re Carlton, No. 08-10624-DHW, 2008 WL 5045908, at *4 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Nov. 24, 2008); 
In re Harless, No. BK 07-71959-CMS-13, 2008 WL 3821781, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Aug. 13, 2008). 
 56 See In re Schwalm, 380 B.R. 630, 635 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008). 
 57 See In re Myers, 393 B.R. 616, 622 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2008). 
 58 See Nuvell Credit Co. v. Muldrew (In re Muldrew), 396 B.R. 915, 925 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
 59 See Porch v. GMAC (In re Porch), Ch. 13 Case No. 08-22404JAD, Adv. No. 08-02284JAD, 2009 WL 
3614439, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2009). 
 60 See In re Vinson, 391 B.R. 754, 758 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2008). 
 61 See In re Austin, 381 B.R. 892, 897 (Bankr. D. Utah 2008); In re Burt, 378 B.R. 352, 362 (Bankr. D. 
Utah 2007). 
 62 See In re Munzberg, No. 07-10560, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 5021, at *6 & n.2 (Bankr. D. Vt. Sept. 29, 
2010), reconsideration denied, 2011 WL 240472 (Bankr. D. Vt. Jan. 21, 2011). 
 63 In re Morey, 414 B.R. 473, 481 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2009); In re Dunlap, 383 B.R. 113, 119 (Bankr. 
E.D. Wis. 2008). 
 64 See In re Whipple, 417 B.R. 86, 87 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2009) (arguing for a federal law definition of 
“purchase money security interest”). 
 65 Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1300–03 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 66 AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835, 838 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008). The 
panel’s adoption of the dual-status approach was not an issue on appeal, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
panel’s holding that financed negative equity is not purchase money. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod 
(In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158, 1160 n.2, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010), en banc reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 108 (2011). 
 67 See In re Williams, No. A09-00745-DMD, 2011 WL 5025230, at *1 n.4 (Bankr. D. Alaska Jan. 31, 
2011) (noting the probable impact of Penrod). 
 68 See In re McCauley, 398 B.R. 41, 47 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008). 
 69 See In re White, 417 B.R. 102, 106 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2009) (holding that the dual-status rule applied to 
the confirmed plan). 
 70 See In re Bandura, No. 08-50378, 2008 WL 2782851, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. July 15, 2008). 
 71 See In re Busby, 393 B.R. 443, 448 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2008). 
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Washington,75 West Virginia,76 and Wisconsin77 have also followed the dual-
status approach. Although most of these opinions confined their choice of law 
to UCC § 9-103(a)(2), a few—including the bankruptcy appellate panel in 
Penrod—have packaged the dual-status approach as a federal rule of 
decision.78 
Finally, a few courts have denied the protection of the hanging paragraph 
altogether, permitting bifurcation of the entire claim. Bankruptcy courts in 
Alabama,79 Florida,80 and Tennessee81 have cited state-law “transformation” 
rules to hold that the non-purchase-money component vitiates the loan’s 
purchase-money status. Another Tennessee court,82 and one in Maine,83 have 
reached the same result on federal-law grounds, holding that the hanging 
paragraph does not protect a loan with a non-purchase-money component, 
 
 72 See In re Valiquette, No. 09-64167-fra13, 2010 WL 695991, at *2 (Bankr. D. Or. Feb. 24, 2010) 
(following Penrod); In re Riach, No. 07-61645-aer13, 2008 WL 474384, at *4 (Bankr. D. Or. Feb. 19, 2008); 
In re Johnson, 380 B.R. 236, 250 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007). 
 73 GMAC v. Mancini (In re Mancini), 390 B.R. 796, 807 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008). But see Porch v. 
GMAC (In re Porch), Ch. 13 Case No. 08-22404JAD, Adv. No. 08-02284JAD, 2009 WL 3614439, at *2 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2009). 
 74 In re Hayes, 376 B.R. 655, 674 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007). But see In re Mitchell, 379 B.R. 131, 141 
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007) (denying altogether the application of the hanging paragraph on federal law 
grounds); In re Bray, 365 B.R. 850, 863 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2007) (applying a state law transformation rule). 
 75 In re Siemers, No. 11-44935, 2011 WL 5598349, at *3 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. Nov. 17, 2011) (following 
Penrod); In re Wear, No. 07-42537, 2008 WL 217172, at *3 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. Jan. 23, 2008). 
 76 In re Hall, 400 B.R. 516, 521 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 2008). 
 77 See In re Crawford, 397 B.R. 461, 468 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008). But see In re Morey, 414 B.R. 473, 
480 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2009); In re Dunlap, 383 B.R. 113, 117 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008). 
 78 The bankruptcy appellate panel in Penrod proposed that “the Dual Status Rule should be applied as the 
federal rule,” even in the face of contrary state law. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 
B.R. 835, 859 & n.25 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 611 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2010), en banc reh’g denied, 636 
F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 108 (2011). The panel’s decision to apply the dual-status 
approach as federal rule was not at issue on appeal. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 
F.3d 1158, 1160 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010), en banc reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. 
Ct. 108 (2011). Bankruptcy courts in Oregon, Vermont, and West Virginia have similarly applied the dual-
status rule to effectuate the purposes of BAPCPA. See In re Hall, 400 B.R. at 521; In re Munzberg, 388 B.R. 
529, 546 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2008); In re Johnson, 380 B.R. 236, 250 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007); see also In re Westfall, 
376 B.R. 210, 219 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) (adopting “use of the dual status rule for the purposes of the 
hanging paragraph”), rev’d sub nom. Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 
2010). 
 79 See In re Tuck, No. 06-10886-DHW, 2007 WL 4365456, at *3 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Dec. 10, 2007) 
(applying a state-law transformation rule). 
 80 See In re Blakeslee, 377 B.R. 724, 730–31 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007). 
 81 See In re Bray, 365 B.R. 850, 863 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2007). 
 82 See In re Mitchell, 379 B.R. 131, 141 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007). 
 83 See In re Look, 383 B.R. 210, 220−21 (Bankr. D. Me. 2008). 
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regardless of the applicable state-law approach. However, authorities 
categorically denying the protection of the hanging paragraph have frequently 
been reversed on appeal.84 
II. IS REFINANCED NEGATIVE EQUITY “PURCHASE MONEY?” 
Valuing an auto loan for cramdown purposes often requires bankruptcy 
judges to interpret not one, but three interlocking and highly ambiguous 
statutory texts. The reference to “purchase money” in Bankruptcy Code 
§ 1325(a) directs the interpreter to a vexingly abstract definition given in UCC 
§ 9-103 and an open-ended list of examples in the accompanying Official 
Comment 3. Instead of providing clarity, this multi-step inquiry has only sent 
courts deeper into a semantic thicket. The next subparts of this Article show 
why existing rationales for according purchase-money status to financed 
negative equity are unconvincing.  
This Part concludes by proposing an alternative approach. I argue that a 
reading of the UCC that is attentive to its historical treatment of consumer-
goods transactions yields powerful insight into the definitional boundaries of 
purchase money in this context. In drafting Revised Article 9, those pushing 
for a more expansive concept of purchase money successfully assimilated 
many transaction costs into the items a purchase-money loan could finance, but 
they were unsuccessful with respect to the forms of financial engineering 
embodied in a trade-in sale with financed negative equity.85 Thus, the drafting 
history of § 9-103 suggests that funds used to retire negative equity are not 
purchase money under the law of most states. Provisions of § 9-103 addressing 
the purchase-money status of cross-collateralization and refinancing 
transactions confirm this understanding. 
 
 84 See, e.g., In re Price, 363 B.R. 734, 746 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 5:07-
CV-133-BR, 2007 WL 5297071 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 14, 2007), rev’d, 562 F.3d 618 (4th Cir. 2009); In re Sanders, 
377 B.R. 836, 864 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ford Motor Credit v. Sanders (In re Sanders), 403 
B.R. 435 (W.D. Tex. 2009); In re Peaslee, 358 B.R. 545, 555 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2006), rev’d sub nom. Gen. 
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Peaslee (In re Peaslee), 373 B.R. 252 (W.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Reiber v. 
GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 585 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 85 See infra note 203. 
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A. Does Federal Law Regulate the Content of “Purchase Money”? 
Bankruptcy Code § 1325(a) protects a claim from bifurcation if, among 
other things, “a purchase money security interest secur[es] the debt that is the 
subject of the claim,”86 yet the Code fails to define “purchase money.” While 
most authorities consult state law to determine the purchase-money status of 
financed negative equity, some courts have argued that federal law helps to 
resolve the issue.87 However, because purchase-money obligations are 
creatures of state law, this Subpart concludes that the purchase-money status of 
negative trade-in equity eludes resolution on purely federal-law grounds. 
The most popular, albeit flawed, federal-law argument favoring the 
automobile creditor attempts to reconstruct congressional intent based on the 
general purposes of the hanging paragraph. This argument proceeds, in part, 
from an assumption that the “architects [of the hanging paragraph] intended 
only good things for car lenders and other lienholders”88 and were hostile to 
cramdown in chapter 13 cases.89 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned in Graupner 
that “the hanging paragraph ultimately seeks to require a debtor electing to 
retain a ‘910 vehicle’ to pay the creditor the full amount of the claim and 
not . . . an amount equal to the present value of the car.”90 Additionally, since 
“[r]olling a trade-in’s negative equity into the purchase price of a new vehicle 
was a common occurrence at the time BAPCPA was enacted in 2005,”91 courts 
have expressed reluctance “to read the hanging paragraph in a way that denies 
its protections to a large percentage of claims held by car lenders.”92 
 
 86 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006). 
 87 The leading example is In re Whipple, 417 B.R. 86, 87 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2009), which held that 
“Congress intended the hanging paragraph to be interpreted as a matter of federal law so that ‘purchase money 
security interest’ is accorded a uniform federal definition.” 
 88 Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2008) (alteration in 
original) (quoting AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Long (In re Long), 519 F.3d 288, 294 (6th Cir. 2008)). 
 89 See In re Morey, 414 B.R. 473, 481 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2009); Nuvell Credit Co. v. Muldrew (In re 
Muldrew), 396 B.R. 915, 924 (E.D. Mich. 2008); In re Dunlap, 383 B.R. 113, 118 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008). 
 90 In re Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1302 (citing Trejos v. VW Credit, Inc. (In re Trejos), 374 B.R. 210, 220 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007)); see also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 745 
(8th Cir. 2009) (Bye, J., dissenting). Graupner’s reference to a “910 vehicle” refers to “a motor 
vehicle . . . acquired for the personal use of the debtor” financed by a purchase-money loan “incurred within 
the 910-day period preceding the date of the filing of the petition.” 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9) (2006). 
 91 In re Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1303. 
 92 Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 628 (4th Cir. 2009); see also 
AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Padgett (In re Padgett), 408 B.R. 374, 381 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2009). 
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Yet even if congressional intent controlled the construction of “purchase 
money security interest,” this “imaginative reconstruction”93 of Congress’s 
intent would be less than fully convincing. First, the argument that the 
creditors should prevail because the “architects [of the hanging paragraph] 
intended only good things for car lenders and other lienholders”94 advances an 
implicit, winner-takes-all concept of interest group pluralism that is hard to 
defend on normative or empirical grounds.95 As one opinion retorted, 
“Congress must reconcile many competing interests when drafting legislation. 
Presuming Congress resolved all policy questions in favor of one constituency 
is simplistic and likely inaccurate.”96 “[N]othing in the statute or the legislative 
history,” another argued, “says that Congress intended to give car lenders and 
others not just good things, but everything.”97 In drafting the hanging 
paragraph, Congress had to balance greater protection of auto lenders against 
the interests of the credit card industry and other lobbies pressing for the 
enactment of BAPCPA.98  
Second, the text and legislative history of the hanging paragraph reinforce 
the conclusion that Congress did not extend the statute’s benefits to every car 
loan, regardless of its purchase-money status.99 The “purchase money security 
interest” limitation first appeared in S. 3186, introduced in October 2000;100 an 
earlier House bill would have extended the hanging paragraph’s protection to 
any claim secured by a motor vehicle within the lookback period.101 “Congress 
specifically chose to use the term ‘purchase money security interest’ instead of 
something broader.”102 Enforcing the hanging paragraph’s limited application 
to “purchase money security interests” requires careful construction of the 
term, not airy references to Congress’s general intent to protect creditors. 
 
 93 This phrase is borrowed from William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 
630 (1990). 
 94 In re Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1303 (quoting AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Long (In re Long), 519 
F.3d 288, 294 (6th Cir. 2008)). 
 95 See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 447–49 
(1989). 
 96 Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1294 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., 
dissenting). 
 97 In re Padgett, 408 B.R. at 393 (Starzynski, J., concurring). 
 98 See Whitford, supra note 4, at 181–83. 
 99 See In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1292 (“I cannot conclude the hanging paragraph protects any and every 
loan secured by an automobile.”). 
 100 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, S. 3186, 106th Cong. § 306(b) (2000). 
 101 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 833, 106th Cong. § 306(b) (as passed by Senate, Feb. 2, 2000). 
 102 In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1294. 
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Third, while it is tempting to imagine that Congress would have intended 
for the hanging paragraph to extend to the large segment of the market 
represented by trade-in sales with negative equity, even this claim is suspect. 
The hanging paragraph’s 910-day lookback period suggests that “[t]he problem 
that Congress intended to address was the simple one of the debtor purchasing 
a vehicle and then shortly thereafter filing a Chapter 13 petition and writing 
down the value of the vehicle” to avoid paying the full value of the loan.103 If 
this problem is unique to the automobile market, it is because cars depreciate 
rapidly from the time of sale, leaving auto lenders immediately undersecured. 
However, in a trade-in sale with negative equity, the excess debt is 
undersecured from the get-go because it is inherited from the buyer’s earlier 
loan. Moreover, many trade-in transactions roll over negative equity from 
loans incurred prior to the 910-day lookback period.104 In sum, the problem of 
excess debt inherited from a trade-in vehicle seems sufficiently dissimilar from 
that of a deficiency arising within 910 days of the sale to cast doubt on the 
claim that Congress intended to treat these issues identically. 
Fourth, purchase-money status for refinanced negative equity is potentially 
incongruous with other bankruptcy principles. If a federal-law concept of 
purchase money existed, it would likely encompass the enabling transfers 
described in Code § 547, which BAPCPA’s drafters seemingly equated with 
“Purchase Money Security Interests.”105 Among other requirements, these 
transactions must “secure[] new value;” must be “given to enable the debtor to 
acquire such property;” and must “in fact [be] used by the debtor to acquire 
such property.”106 However, the definition of “new value” in this context “does 
not include an obligation substituted for an existing obligation”; that is, it 
excludes refinancing transactions.107 Thus, the best candidate for a federal-law 
 
 103 See also AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Padgett (In re Padgett), 408 B.R. 374, 392 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 
2009). 
 104 Judge Bea argued in Penrod that because “the loan company which held title to the [trade-in vehicle] 
had a purchase money secur[ity] interest . . . . the fact that the old loan is rolled into a new one” should not 
“make a difference.” AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 636 F.3d 1175, 1177 (9th Cir. 
2011) (Bea, J., dissenting from the denial of en banc rehearing). Yet, it is far from obvious that the hanging 
paragraph should apply if the “old loan” were incurred more than 910 days before the filing of the petition. 
 105 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 1222, 
119 Stat. 23, 196 (2005) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(B) (2006)); 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(A) (2006). 
 106 Id. § 547(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added). 
 107 Id. § 547(a)(2). 
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“purchase money security interest” would likely exclude the portion of an auto 
loan that refinanced the debtor’s existing automobile loan.108 
It is difficult then to discern support for the view that BAPCPA itself 
brought negative equity into the ambit of purchase money. The better 
approach, adopted by the “great majority” of opinions, recognizes that 
Congress employed “purchase money security interest” as a state-law term of 
art.109 On this view, “[c]ongressional intent cannot expand [state-law] 
definitions beyond their traditional meanings . . . to include negative equity 
financing,” regardless of the benefits Congress intended to confer on the 
hanging paragraph’s beneficiaries.110 Because the purchase-money security 
interest is a creature of state law, it invites application of Nobelman v. 
American Savings Bank’s guidance suggesting that courts “assume that 
Congress has left the determination of property rights . . . to state law.”111 
To be sure, a small minority has held that “purchase money security 
interest” should have a uniform federal definition “not dependent upon or 
subject to the variations in . . . state law.”112 Moreover, if Congress had 
intended to incorporate a state-law term of art, one bankruptcy judge reasoned 
that it could have done so explicitly: “Congress routinely and expressly 
incorporates state law when it wants to, and did not do so here.”113 Yet the 
hanging paragraph’s enacted text evinces no intent to enforce a separate 
federal-law definition of the term. For example, during the drafting of 
BAPCPA, Congress abandoned an early effort to craft a federal-law definition 
 
 108 Cf. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(concluding that refinanced negative equity consisted of “old obligations that have been repackaged,” and thus, 
“would not qualify as new value”), en banc reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. 
Ct. 108 (2011). 
 109 See, e.g., Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 624 (4th Cir. 2009). The 
Second Circuit even certified the question of its interpretation to the New York Court of Appeals. Reiber v. 
GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 547 F.3d 177, 179 (2d Cir. 2008), certifying question to Reiber v. GMAC, LLC 
(In re Peaslee), 913 N.E.2d 387 (N.Y. 2009). 
 110 Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 747 (8th Cir. 2009) (Bye, J., 
dissenting); accord In re White, 417 B.R. 102, 106 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2009) (“Congress chose not to alter or 
expand the traditional meanings of purchase money obligation and PMSI . . . .”). 
 111 Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 329 (1993) (quoting Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 
54 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 112 In re Whipple, 417 B.R. 86, 95 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2009); In re Van Dyke, No. 08-82866, 2009 WL 
5206449, at *4 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2009). 
 113 In re Whipple, 417 B.R. at 95. 
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of the claims protected from bifurcation,114 in favor of the enacted language 
referring to the well-known state-law concept of “purchase money.”115 Thus, it 
is state law to which the hanging paragraph’s interpreters must inevitably turn. 
B. “Purchase-Money Obligation” in Article 9 
Article 9 of the UCC governs the definition,116 perfection,117 and priority of 
purchase-money security interests.118 However, the law “does not provide a 
precise, encapsulated definition of purchase money security interest, but rather 
a string of connected definitions.”119 At the time of BAPCPA’s drafting,120 
Former Article 9-107 defined “purchase money security interest” as a security 
interest 
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part 
of its price; or 
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an 
obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the 
use of collateral if such value is in fact so used.121 
This language was condensed in Revised Article 9-103(a)(2), which provides 
that “‘purchase-money obligation’ means an obligation . . . incurred as all or 
part of the price of the collateral or for value given to enable the debtor to 
acquire rights in or the use of the collateral if the value is in fact so used.”122 
 
 114 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 833, 106th Cong. § 122 (as placed on Senate calendar, May 
12, 1999) (preventing bifurcation of “an allowed claim to the extent attributable in whole or in part to the 
purchase price of personal property”). 
 115 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, S. 3186, 106th Cong. § 306(b) (2000). 
 116 U.C.C. § 9-103 (2011). 
 117 Id. § 9-309(1). 
 118 Id. § 9-324. 
 119 AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 2010), en banc 
reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 108 (2011). 
 120 Revised Article 9 became effective in 2001. U.C.C. § 9-701. 
 121 U.C.C. § 9-107 (1972) (current version at U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(2) (2011)). Official Comment 2 added: 
When a purchase money interest is claimed by a secured party who is not a seller, he must of 
course have given present consideration. This section therefore provides that the purchase money 
party must be one who gives value “by making advances or incurring an obligation . . . .” 
Id. § 9-107 cmt. 2 (current version at U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3 (2011)). The quoted language excludes from the 
purchase money category any security interest taken as security for or in satisfaction of a pre-existing claim or 
antecedent debt. Id. 
 122 U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(2) (2011). Official Comment 3 adds: 
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Following these interpretive guideposts, courts have sought to determine 
whether financing the negative equity in the debtor’s trade-in vehicle (1) 
represents “all or part of the price of the collateral” or (2) constitutes “value 
given to enable the debtor to acquire rights in . . . the collateral.”123 Most courts 
have looked to the accompanying Official Comment 3 to help illuminate these 
highly general provisions. Official Comment 3 notes that a purchase-money 
obligation might finance “expenses incurred in connection with acquiring 
rights in the collateral” and “other similar obligations.”124 Occasionally, courts 
have also looked to their jurisdiction’s automobile-finance statute to determine 
whether negative equity is part of the vehicle’s “price.”125 Despite the 
complexity of this inquiry, the courts’ disagreement ultimately appears to 
center on whether financing negative equity is better viewed as incidental to 
the new-vehicle purchase or as a separate transaction.126 Lost in this essentially 
indeterminate debate are legislative-historical clues. Part II.D argues that these 
clues favor a more restrictive, formal understanding of “purchase money” that 
would exclude negative trade-in equity. 
1. Purchase Money as “Part of the Price of the Collateral” 
While most authorities resort to Official Comment 3 to interpret § 9-103’s 
reference to “the price of the collateral,”127 a few opinions have held, 
unconvincingly, that the phrase’s plain meaning precludes according purchase-
money status to financed negative equity. One influential opinion, which was 
subsequently reversed, argued that the term “‘price of the collateral’ need 
 
As used in subsection (a)(2), the definition of “purchase-money obligation,” the “price” of 
collateral or the “value given to enable” includes obligations for expenses incurred in connection 
with acquiring rights in the collateral, sales taxes, duties, finance charges, interest, freight 
charges, costs of storage in transit, demurrage, administrative charges, expenses of collection and 
enforcement, attorney’s fees, and other similar obligations. 
Id. § 9-103 cmt. 3. Additionally, a “‘purchase-money security interest’ requires a close nexus between the 
acquisition of collateral and the secured obligation. Thus, a security interest does not qualify as a purchase-
money security interest if a debtor acquires property on unsecured credit and subsequently creates the security 
interest to secure the purchase price.” Id. 
 123 Id. § 9-103(a)(2). 
 124 Id. § 9-103 cmt. 3. 
 125 See infra Part II.B.1. 
 126 See, e.g., Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We 
conclude the trade-in exchange is essentially a single transaction.”). 
 127 See infra Part II.C. 
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not . . . sweep up more than the common understanding of the phrase.”128 The 
court speculated that “the person on the street might be surprised to learn that a 
court had concluded that the cost of paying off the excess loan on the trade-in 
should also count as ‘the price’ of the [new] vehicle itself.”129 Similarly, 
another court has argued that “the definition of purchase money obligation 
itself limits itself to ‘all or part’ of the price of the collateral, suggesting that 
the ‘price’ is the upper limit.”130 In these opinions, a purchase-money loan is 
one that finances only the price of the collateral securing it; other items, such 
as legacy debt retired to facilitate the transaction, are excluded from the 
commonsense meaning of “the price of the collateral.” The trouble with these 
interpretations is that they cannot account for the language of Official 
Comment 3, which explicitly stretches the meaning of “price” beyond its plain 
meaning.131 
In contrast with this plain-meaning analysis, other courts have looked to 
their jurisdictions’ automobile-finance statutes to determine what “price” 
means in the technical context of a vehicle sale.132 These statutes “typically 
include definitions of ‘cash price’ or ‘total sales price’ which include negative 
equity.”133 For example, the bankruptcy court in Graupner read Georgia’s 
automobile-finance statute in pari materia with Article 9.134 Because the 
statute explicitly incorporated financed negative equity into the “cash sale 
 
 128 In re Sanders, 377 B.R. 836, 853 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ford Motor Credit v. 
Sanders (In re Sanders), 403 B.R. 435 (W.D. Tex. 2009). 
 129 Id. at 852. 
 130 AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Padgett (In re Padgett), 408 B.R. 374, 389 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2009) 
(Starzynski, J., concurring). 
 131 See U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3 (2011). 
 132 See Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1299, 1301 & n.3 (11th Cir. 
2008) (collecting cases). Graupner cited Georgia’s vehicle-finance statute, but this has not been viewed as 
crucial to its holding. See In re Carlton, No. 08-10624-DHW, 2008 WL 5045908, at *3 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 
Nov. 24, 2008). 
 133 Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 746 (8th Cir. 2009) (Bye, J., 
dissenting). In contrast, some states’ automobile-finance statutes exclude negative equity from the “price” of a 
vehicle. See, e.g., In re Wear, No. 07-42537, 2008 WL 217172, at *3 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. Jan. 23, 2008) 
(noting this trend in Washington, Oregon, New York, Georgia, and California); In re Johnson, 380 B.R. 236, 
244 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007) (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 83.510(1) (2001)). 
 134 In re Graupner, 356 B.R. 907, 922 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Graupner v. Nuvell Credit 
Corp. (In re Graupner), No. 4:07-CV-37CDL, 2007 WL 1858291 (M.D. Ga. June 26, 2007), aff’d, 537 F.3d 
1295 (11th Cir. 2008). 
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price” of a retail installment contract,135 the court concluded that the definition 
of “price” under Georgia’s § 9-103(a)(2) included these sums.136 Other courts 
have reached analogous holdings based on their states’ respective statutes.137 
Yet other circuits have resisted statutory invitations to read the forum 
state’s automobile-finance statute in pari materia with the “price” prong of 
§ 9-103(a)(2). For example, the Seventh Circuit noted that Illinois’s Article 9 
gives way to other statutes establishing “a different rule for consumers,”138 
including the state’s Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act,139 which 
“allows a car dealer or financier to include negative equity in the amount of the 
price of the car that he finances, just as he can include an attorney’s fee.”140 
California’s Article 9 also explicitly incorporates the state’s automobile-
finance statute.141 It defines a vehicle’s “cash price” to include “payment of a 
prior credit or lease balance remaining on property being traded in.”142 Despite 
the statutes’ seemingly inclusive language, both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits 
held that the respective statutes defined “price” for the limited purpose of 
regulating disclosure to car buyers; neither regulated the scope of a car 
lender’s purchase-money priority vis-à-vis other creditors.143 
 
 135 GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-31(a)(1) (West 2011) (“[C]ash sale price may also include any amount 
paid . . . on behalf of the buyer to satisfy a lease on or a lien on or a security interest in a motor vehicle used as 
a trade-in . . . .”). 
 136 In re Graupner, 356 B.R. at 922–23. 
 137 See, e.g., In re Mierkowski, 580 F.3d at 743 (“[I]nterpreting ‘price’ in Article 9 to include negative 
equity is consistent with the definition of ‘time sale price’ in [the Missouri Motor Vehicle Time Sales Act].”); 
In re Morey, 414 B.R. 473, 481 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2009) (reading the Wisconsin Consumer Act in pari 
materia with Wisconsin’s version of Article 9); In re Smith, 401 B.R. 343, 352–53 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2008) 
(reading an Illinois automobile-finance statute in pari materia with Article 9); In re Cohrs, 373 B.R. 107, 110 
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2007) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 2981(e) (West 2006)); Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re 
Peaslee), 913 N.E.2d 387, 390 (N.Y. 2009) (noting that New York’s Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales 
Act defines “price” to include financed negative equity). 
 138 Howard v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. (In re Howard), 597 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting 810 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-201(b)(2) (2001)). 
 139 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 375/2.8, 2.10 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 97-1132 of the 2012 Reg. 
Sess.). 
 140 In re Howard, 597 F.3d at 856–57. 
 141 CAL. COM. CODE § 9201(b) (West 2012). 
 142 Id. CIV. § 2981(e). 
 143 AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 2010), en banc 
reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 108 (2011); In re Howard, 597 F.3d at 
857; accord Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 747 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(Bye, J., dissenting); In re Crawford, 397 B.R. 461, 467 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008). 
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At most then, the rules governing negative equity in state automobile-
finance statutes provide “evidence that negative equity is indeed a common 
element of a credit purchase of a car.”144 Perhaps reinforcing this conclusion, 
Official Comment 3 provides an extensive list of expenses included in the 
“‘price’ of collateral.”145 This suggests an intention to define the term rather 
than to incorporate existing meanings. 
2. Purchase Money as “Value Given to Enable” 
Many courts have looked to language in § 9-103(a)(2) defining purchase 
money as “value given to enable the debtor to acquire rights in . . . the 
collateral,”146 seizing on its seemingly more accommodating language.147 
These courts have held that paying off the negative equity in a trade-in 
“enables” the transaction by discharging the lien on the trade-in so that the 
buyer may exchange it for the new car. “[T]he payoff of Debtors’ negative 
equity in their trade-in vehicle ‘enabled’ them to purchase the vehicle,” one 
court held, because it “played an integral role in the overall transaction.”148 
Specifically, “[r]eleasing the lien on the trade-in vehicle allows the dealer to 
sell it and, in turn, makes the purchase of the new vehicle possible.”149 Many 
courts have observed that there is often no other way for a car buyer to dispose 
of her over-encumbered trade-in vehicle.150 
In contrast, other courts have argued that paying off the negative equity in 
the trade-in vehicle is a separate transaction completed to accommodate the 
borrower’s circumstances rather than to facilitate the sale of the new vehicle.151 
For example, one widely cited opinion urged that to satisfy the UCC’s 
definition, “the value must be used to acquire rights in the collateral, as 
 
 144 In re Howard, 597 F.3d at 857. 
 145 U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3 (2011). 
 146 Id. § 9-103(a)(2).  
 147 See, e.g., Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 503 (6th Cir. 2010); Ford 
Motor Credit Co. v. Dale (In re Dale), 582 F.3d 568, 575 (5th Cir. 2009); Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. 
Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 625 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 148 In re Westfall, 599 F.3d at 505; see also In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 575; In re Price, 562 F.3d at 625–26; 
Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 913 N.E.2d 387, 390 (N.Y. 2009). 
 149 In re Westfall, 599 F.3d at 505; see also In re Morey, 414 B.R. 473, 480 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2009). 
 150 See, e.g., Howard v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. (In re Howard), 597 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 151 See e.g., In re Sanders, 377 B.R. 836, 855 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ford Motor Credit 
v. Sanders (In re Sanders), 403 B.R. 435 (W.D. Tex. 2009). 
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opposed to, for example, enabling the transaction that ultimately results in the 
borrowers acquiring rights in the collateral.”152 
The view that refinancing the borrower’s existing car loan is “readily 
separable from the purchase transaction itself,”153 and thus is not purchase 
money, turns on the intuition that a car buyer need not trade in or refinance her 
existing vehicle to purchase a new one. All aspects of the trade-in 
transaction—the purchase of a new vehicle, the sale of an existing vehicle, and 
the refinancing of the existing vehicle—can occur separately. For example, a 
borrower may opt to refinance her existing vehicle while purchasing an 
additional vehicle (e.g., for a family member).154 In such a case, the entire loan 
does not enable the purchase of the new vehicle nor is the “value given” “in 
fact so used.”155 Alternatively, a debtor seeking to reduce her loan balance 
might sell her over-encumbered vehicle and refinance the negative equity 
without purchasing a new car.156 Finally, a debtor not looking to sell or buy a 
car can refinance her vehicle to obtain cash.157 Notably, none of these 
scenarios includes the necessary link between the refinancing of the existing 
vehicle and the purchase of a new one. Instead, each of these refinancing 
transactions merely facilitates the car owner’s financial goals by, respectively, 
consolidating two car loans, reducing a loan balance, and obtaining a cash 
advance. These examples suggest that a debtor financing the negative equity in 
 
 152 Id. In response, the Fourth Circuit argued that “[f]rom a practical perspective, that distinction is 
meaningless. If negative equity financing enabled the transaction in which the new car was acquired, then, in 
reality, the negative equity financing also enabled the acquisition of rights in the new car.” In re Price, 562 
F.3d at 625; accord AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 636 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 
2011) (Bea, J., dissenting from the denial of en banc rehearing). Another panel has noted that even if financing 
negative equity is not strictly necessary to enable the purchase of a new vehicle, recognizing that such 
transactions are often practically indispensable is appropriate because it “comports with the factual realities of 
the industry practice of financing negative equity.” AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Padgett (In re Padgett), 
408 B.R. 374, 380 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2009). 
 153 In re Peaslee, 913 N.E.2d at 391 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 154 See, e.g., In re Vega, 344 B.R. 616, 617 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006). 
 155 Id. at 622. 
 156 See, e.g., Joe Sangl, Selling a Car with Negative Equity Isn’t Easy, but It’s Possible, ANDERSON INDEP. 
MAIL (Sept. 10, 2008, 6:24 PM), http://www.independentmail.com/news/2008/sep/10/selling-car-negative-
equity-isnt-easy-its-possible/. 
 157 In re Horn, 338 B.R. 110, 112 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2006) (debtor repeatedly refinanced her auto loan 
with additional cash advances); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 744 
(8th Cir. 2009) (Bye, J., dissenting). 
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her vehicle does not necessarily do so to enable the purchase of the new car,158 
and thus is incurring something other than a purchase-money loan. 
The problem with this logic is that any purchase-money loan could be 
characterized as facilitating unrelated financial goals. For instance, a borrower 
might finance her vehicle, instead of paying out of pocket, to maintain liquidity 
for other major expenses. A trade-in may serve similar purposes. For example, 
a debtor owing a monthly payment of $1,000 on her existing vehicle might not 
wish to pay an additional $900 monthly payment on a new vehicle. If she can 
trade in her existing vehicle and work off the negative equity at a rate of $200 
per month, however, the consolidated payment of $1,100 per month might 
bring the new vehicle more easily within reach. Trade-in transactions, like car 
loans in general, allow buyers to pay over time, thereby making cars affordable 
to those with limited means or high expenses.159 
Still, “value given to enable” seemingly requires some limiting principle, 
lest it explode the concept of purchase money. Judges have proffered 
numerous examples of transactions that “enable” the sale of a new vehicle in 
the same way that a financed trade-in does, but are intuitively distinct from 
purchase money.160 Perhaps the best argument for narrowly construing “value 
given to enable” is that many enabling transactions are potentially “in 
derogation of the rights and interests of other creditors.”161 That is, the 
privileges attached to purchase-money status must be carefully conserved in 
the context of refinancing loans and similar transactions because they implicate 
the inter-creditor conflicts that are Article 9’s core subject matter.162 
Formulated too broadly, a purchase-money priority for refinancing transactions 
could undo the general rule that an earlier secured creditor “has priority over 
later creditors in the assets in which it has security.”163 Hence, interpretive 
 
 158 See Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1289 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, 
J., dissenting). 
 159 Cf. Howard v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. (In re Howard), 597 F.3d 852, 858 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 160 See, e.g., In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1291 (refinancing credit card debt); In re Westfall, 365 B.R. 755, 762 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) (life-saving appendectomy), rev’d sub nom. Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re 
Westfall), 599 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 161 AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Padgett (In re Padgett), 408 B.R. 374, 392 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2009) 
(Starzynski, J., concurring). 
 162 This explains the intuition that value given to refinance an existing loan is “not ‘in fact so used’ as 
further required by the statute. The monies are used to extinguish a pre-existing debt.” In re White, 417 B.R. 
102, 105 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2009); see also In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1289. 
 163 Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 209 (1989). 
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caution should be taken before according purchase-money status to any 
transaction that seemingly enables the purchase of a vehicle.164 
However, the more straightforward problem with equating purchase money 
with “value given to enable” is that the provision was drafted to merely extend 
the purchase-money security interest to third-party lenders;165 it does not give 
broader, alternative content to the concept of purchase money. This is apparent 
in the statute’s evolution. Former Article 9-107 distinguished between a 
purchase-money security interest “taken . . . by the seller of the collateral to 
secure all or part of its price”166 and one “taken by a person who by making 
advances or incurring an obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire 
rights in . . . the . . . collateral.”167 This distinction survives in Revised Article 
9. For example, an Official Comment to Article 9-324 distinguishes between 
“purchase-money security interests securing the price of collateral (i.e., created 
in favor of the seller)” and “purchase-money security interests that secure 
enabling loans.”168 Thus, the “value given to enable” prong “is employed to 
encompass third party financing, not to expand the scope of purchase money 
security interests.”169  
Other evidence reinforces this conclusion. If “value given to enable” 
expanded the definition of purchase money, then the “all or part of the price” 
language would be superfluous, since any loan financing “all or part of the 
price of the collateral” would represent “value given to enable” its purchase. 
Even if the “value given to enable” prong offered an alternative basis on which 
sellers could claim purchase-money status, Official Comment 3 precludes 
reading this basis more broadly than the “all or part of the price” prong. It 
provides that, “[a]s used in subsection (a)(2), the definition of ‘purchase-
money obligation,’ the ‘price’ of collateral or the ‘value given to enable’ 
 
 164 The treatment of refinancing and similar transactions under § 9-103 is the subject of Part II.D. 
 165 See Howard v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. (In re Howard), 597 F.3d 852, 855–56 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The 
‘value given’ part of the definition is intended to make clear that the obligation can be to a finance company, 
as in this case, rather than to the seller.”); Gilmore, supra note 27, at 1373–74. 
 166 See U.C.C. § 9-107(a) (1972) (current version at U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(2) (2011)). 
 167 Id. § 9-107(b) (current version at U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(2) (2011)). In the case of a third-party financer, an 
Official Comment to Article 9-107 describes limitations on how “a secured party who is not a seller” may 
“give[] value.” Id. § 9-107 cmt. 2. 
 168 U.C.C. § 9-324 cmt. 13 (2011). 
 169 AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010), en banc 
reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 108 (2011). 
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includes [the same things].”170 In sum, even the apparently expansive language 
of the “value given to enable” prong offers auto lenders far less than initially 
meets the eye. 
C. Parsing Official Comment 3 
Informing the interpretation of § 9-103, the accompanying Official 
Comment 3 explains that 
the “price” of collateral or the “value given to enable” includes 
obligations for expenses incurred in connection with acquiring rights 
in the collateral, sales taxes, duties, finance charges, interest, freight 
charges, costs of storage in transit, demurrage, administrative 
charges, expenses of collection and enforcement, attorney’s fees, and 
other similar obligations.171 
Noting the capacious phrasing of “obligations for expenses incurred in 
connection with acquiring rights in the collateral” and “other similar 
obligations,” many courts have held that the inclusion of these categories 
implies that “the definitions of ‘price’ and ‘value’ should be interpreted 
broadly.”172 In addition, the Comment provides that a “‘purchase-money 
security interest’ requires a close nexus between the acquisition of collateral 
and the secured obligation.”173 This Subpart considers the import of each of 
these provisions in turn. 
Official Comment 3’s reference to “obligations for expenses incurred in 
connection with acquiring rights in the collateral” forms the basis of prominent 
decisions favoring automobile creditors.174 As the Fifth Circuit noted, such 
expenses form “a stand alone category” not limited by “language like ‘such as’ 
or ‘including’ between that phrase and the additional listed expenses.”175 The 
Seventh Circuit observed that the term “seems a pretty good description of 
 
 170 U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting In re 
Myers, 393 B.R. 616, 621 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2008)). 
 173 U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3. 
 174 See, e.g., Howard v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. (In re Howard), 597 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 2010); Ford 
Motor Credit Co. v. Dale (In re Dale), 582 F.3d 568, 575 (5th Cir. 2009); Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In 
re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1284–85 (10th Cir. 2009) (examining Kansas law, which adopted the UCC); Wells 
Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 627 (4th Cir. 2009) (examining North Carolina 
law, which adopted the UCC); In re Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1301–02. 
 175 In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 575. 
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negative equity. It is an obligation assumed by the buyer of the car in 
connection with his acquiring ownership.”176 The Eleventh Circuit saw “no 
persuasive reason why . . . the refinancing of reasonable, bona fide negative 
equity in connection with the purchase of the new vehicle should not qualify as 
‘expenses’ within the meaning of the comment.”177 In contrast, the Ninth 
Circuit and others have expressed skepticism that the payoff of a buyer’s trade-
in could even “be characterized as an ‘expense.’”178 The bankruptcy appellate 
panel in Penrod argued that “such a major part of the purchase price can hardly 
be a form of ‘expense’ incurred in order to acquire the car.”179 
Courts have also found significance in the Comment’s reference to “other 
similar obligations.”180 For example, the Eleventh Circuit took this language to 
indicate that “[t]he expenses identified in Comment 3 are merely examples of 
additional components of the ‘price’ of the collateral.”181 While some opinions 
viewed the modifier “similar” as limiting the Comment’s open-ended 
definition to necessary transaction costs,182 the majority rejects this approach. 
For example, the Eleventh Circuit argued that the presence of “attorney’s fees” 
in Official Comment 3 “belies the notion that ‘price’ or ‘value’ is narrowly 
viewed as only those [traditional] expenses that must be paid to drive the car 
off the lot.”183 The Tenth Circuit noted that “[t]he term ‘transaction 
costs[]’ . . . is entirely absent from the statute and the Official Comment. Had 
the drafters of the U.C.C. intended to limit a purchase-money security interest 
 
 176 In re Howard, 597 F.3d at 857. 
 177 In re Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1302; see also In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 575; In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1285; 
In re Price, 562 F.3d at 626. 
 178 AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th Cir. 2010), en banc 
reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 108 (2011); Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re 
Peaslee), 913 N.E.2d 387, 391 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 179 AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835, 848 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 
611 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2010), en banc reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
108 (2011). 
 180 See, e.g., Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 504 (6th Cir. 2010); In re 
Dale, 582 F.3d at 574–75; Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 742 (8th 
Cir. 2009); In re Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1301–02. 
 181 In re Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1302; accord In re Westfall, 599 F.3d at 504; In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 574–
75; In re Mierkowski, 580 F.3d at 742; In re Peaslee, 913 N.E.2d at 389. 
 182 See, e.g., In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1289 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting); In re White, 417 B.R. 102, 105 
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2009); In re Mitchell, 379 B.R. 131, 137 n.8 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007); In re Peaslee, 913 
N.E.2d at 391 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 183 In re Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1302 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Myers, 393 B.R. 616, 620 
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2008)); see also In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 574 (quoting id. at 1302). 
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to cash price plus transaction costs, they could easily have done so.”184 Some 
courts have even held that “the listed expenses in Comment 3 have no common 
feature beyond an attenuated connection to the acquisition or maintenance of 
the vehicle.”185 On this view, there is no principled reason to exclude negative 
equity from the “other similar obligations” that a purchase-money loan might 
finance. 
Yet the character of the enumerated expenses in Official Comment 3 
suggests that “expenses incurred in connection” and “other similar obligations” 
cannot function as a catchall category lacking a limiting principle. Such a 
principle is easily discernable than the case law would suggest; namely, the 
expenses listed in the Comment encompass those expenses necessary for each 
party to realize the value of the transaction. The sale of a vehicle incurs “sales 
taxes, duties, finance charges, interest, freight charges, costs of storage in 
transit, demurrage, [and] administrative charges,” while enforcing the terms of 
the sale may incur “expenses of collection and enforcement, [and] attorney’s 
fees.”186 Granting the car lender priority as to these expenses secures the 
lender’s entire exposure for costs incidental to the sale and the enforcement of 
its terms.187 Negative equity financing “simply does not fit within that 
rubric.”188 Thus, while policymakers might disagree over whether negative 
equity should be given purchase-money status, Official Comment 3 appears to 
not address this issue. Its language focuses on incidental expenses, not the 
complex and sensitive question of the purchase-money character of a 
refinancing transaction, which I address in Part II.D. 
Before turning to that issue, a brief coda is merited for Official Comment 
3’s additional requirement that a purchase-money security interest “requires a 
close nexus between the acquisition of collateral and the secured 
 
 184 In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1285. 
 185 In re Westfall, 599 F.3d at 504 (quoting In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 574). 
 186 U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3 (2011). 
 187 See AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 2010), en 
banc reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 108 (2011); Ford Motor Credit Co. 
v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 746 (8th Cir. 2009); In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1289 
(Tymkovich, J., dissenting). 
 188 In re Penrod, 611 F.3d at 1163; see also id. at 1162–63 (In contrast, “negative equity will ‘typically be 
larger, and more readily separable from the purchase transaction itself, than such things as sales tax, duties and 
finance charges.’” (quoting Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 913 N.E.2d 387, 391 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith, 
J., dissenting))). 
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obligation.”189 Courts adopting the majority position have correctly discerned 
“a ‘close nexus’ between the negative equity in the Debtor’s trade-in vehicle 
and the purchase of his new vehicle,” noting that “[t]he financing was part of 
the same transaction and may be properly regarded as a ‘package deal.’”190 A 
few courts have responded that the “close nexus” requirement is not satisfied 
because “[t]here is no necessary connection between this refinancing and the 
car’s acquisition.”191 Others have argued, based on the Comment’s predecessor 
in Former Article 9,192 that the “close nexus” requirement is not met because 
the negative equity in a trade-in is “antecedent debt,” which is inherently 
distinct from purchase money.193 
Like other debates about the meaning of § 9-103(a)(2) and Official 
Comment 3, the debate over the “close nexus” requirement is unmoored from 
the true import of this provision. Like the “value given to enable” prong of 
Revised Article 9-103,194 the “close nexus” requirement of Official Comment 3 
is simply an artifact of Former Article 9’s provisions for purchase-money loans 
by non-sellers. The predecessor to Comment 3 denied purchase-money status 
where “a secured party who [was] not a seller” sought to take “security for or 
 
 189 U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3. 
 190 Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 2008); see also In re 
Westfall, 599 F.3d at 505; In re Mierkowski, 580 F.3d at 743; In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1285; Wells Fargo Fin. 
Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 627 (4th Cir. 2009); In re Cohrs, 373 B.R. 107, 109–10 
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2007); In re Peaslee, 913 N.E.2d at 390. 
 191 AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835, 852 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 
611 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2010), en banc reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
108 (2011); see also In re Sanders, 377 B.R. 836, 857 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ford Motor 
Credit v. Sanders (In re Sanders), 403 B.R. 435 (W.D. Tex. 2009). 
 192 U.C.C. § 9-107 cmt. 2 (1972) (excluding “from the purchase money category any security interest 
taken as security for or in satisfaction of a preexisting claim or antecedent debt”) (current version at U.C.C. 
§ 9-103 cmt. 3 (2011)). 
 193 See, e.g., In re Penrod, 611 F.3d at 1163; In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1289, 1291 (Tymkovich, J., 
dissenting); AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Padgett (In re Padgett), 408 B.R. 374, 389 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2009) 
(Starzynski, J., concurring); In re Penrod, 392 B.R. at 849; In re White, 417 B.R. 102, 105 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 
2009); In re Hall, 400 B.R. 516, 520 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 2008); In re Crawford, 397 B.R. 461, 465 (Bankr. 
E.D. Wis. 2008); GMAC v. Mancini (In re Mancini), 390 B.R. 796, 805 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008); In re 
Munzberg, 388 B.R. 529, 539 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2008); In re Wear, No. 07-42537, 2008 WL 217172, at *3 
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. Jan. 23, 2008); In re Johnson, 380 B.R. 236, 243 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007); In re Lavigne, 
Nos. 07-30192, 07-31402, 07-31247, 06-32914, 2007 WL 3469454, at *6 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 2007), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. GMAC v. Horne, 390 B.R. 191 (E.D. Va. 2008), aff’d, 394 F. App’x 13 
(4th Cir. 2010); see also In re Mierkowski, 580 F.3d at 744 (Bye, J., dissenting); In re Graupner, 537 F.3d at 
1301 (admitting that “the question [of] whether negative equity on a trade-in vehicle is ‘debt for the money 
required to make the purchase’ of the new vehicle, or . . . ‘antecedent debt[]’ . . . is . . . a close call”). 
 194 See supra text accompanying notes 165–70. 
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in satisfaction of a preexisting claim or antecedent debt.”195 Now phrased as a 
“close nexus” requirement, Comment 3 continues to govern the case where “a 
debtor acquires property on unsecured credit and subsequently creates the 
security interest to secure the purchase price.”196 Ultimately, both formulations 
amount to a requirement that the value given by a third-party lender must be 
“present”197 or otherwise have “a close nexus”198 to the acquisition of the 
collateral. The lender cannot lend on a non-purchase-money basis and then 
later take a purchase-money security interest.199 Thus, a historically sensitive 
reading of the “close nexus” requirement reveals a consistent rule of law that is 
irrelevant to the purchase-money status of negative equity.200 
D. Negative Equity and the Consumer Compromise 
It would appear that courts debating the purchase-money status of negative 
equity have been barking up the wrong textual trees. Frequently, as in the case 
of the “value given to enable” and “close nexus” tests, statutory language that 
at first appears dispositive turns out merely to reflect unrelated rules of law 
inherited from Former Article 9.201 While reading Revised Article 9 against 
Former Article 9 highlights the confused state of the case law on negative 
equity, it also illuminates the neglected provisions of Revised Article 9 that are 
relevant to the status of negative equity. Revised Article 9 was not cut from 
whole cloth. Rather, its drafters were working against a body of background 
law that conceptualized purchase money in highly restrictive, formalistic 
terms, which Revised Article 9 largely preserved in the context of consumer 
finance. The minority of states that adopted a more permissive consumer 
finance regime did so explicitly. However, the majority version of Revised 
 
 195 U.C.C. § 9-107 cmt. 2 (current version at U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3 (2011)). 
 196 U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3 (2011). 
 197 U.C.C. § 9-107 cmt. 2 (1972) (current version at U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3 (2011)); cf. U.C.C. § 9-103 
cmt. 3 (2011) (“[A] security interest does not qualify as a purchase-money security interest if a debtor acquires 
property on unsecured credit and subsequently creates the security interest to secure the purchase price.”). 
 198 U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3 (2011). 
 199 See Gilmore, supra note 27, at 1373–74. 
 200 Thus the majority of courts are correct that “[debt] owed on account of negative equity does not, in 
fact, amount to a refinance of antecedent debt” because “[p]rior to financing the negative equity in connection 
with their purchase of the new vehicle, Debtors owed [the creditor] nothing.” Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall 
(In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 505 (6th Cir. 2010). Put differently, the “close nexus” requirement and the 
“antecedent debt” prohibition do not govern a purchase-money security interest immediately taken by the 
seller of the collateral, such as when a car dealer completes a trade-in transaction. See AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., 
Inc. v. Padgett (In re Padgett), 408 B.R. 374, 389 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2009) (Starzynski, J., concurring). 
 201 See supra Part II.B.2.C. 
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Article 9 is best read as maintaining prior law excluding financed negative 
equity from the limited category of purchase money. 
Although largely ignored by the courts, perhaps the most persuasive 
evidence that Revised Article 9-103 does not expand the “price of the 
collateral” to encompass financed negative equity comes from the text itself. 
Two little-discussed provisions, subsections (b) and (f), explicitly contemplate 
two ways in which an obligation financing an over-encumbered trade-in 
departs from a prototypical purchase-money transaction: it involves both cross-
collateralization and refinancing.202 The specificity of these sections belies the 
popular view that statutory recognition for negative-equity financing is buried 
in Official Comment 3’s general reference to “expenses incurred in connection 
with acquiring rights in the [new vehicle].”203 Instead, these provisions compel 
the conclusion that Revised Article 9 preserves prior lines of authority that 
denied purchase-money status, in whole (under the transformation rule) or in 
part (under the dual-status rule), to cross-collateralized and refinanced 
purchase-money obligations.204 
First, financing negative trade-in equity departs from a traditional purchase-
money loan because it involves a form of cross-collateralization: it uses one 
item of value (the debtor’s new vehicle) to secure debt incurred in the 
acquisition of other property (the trade-in). Courts applying Former Article 9-
107 frequently denied purchase-money status in such cases on the basis that an 
item of purchase-money collateral could not secure more than “all or part of 
[its] price.”205 In the consumer-finance context, the prohibition against cross-
 
 202 U.C.C. § 9-103(b), (f). 
 203 Id. § 9-103 cmt. 3. 
 204 Under the transformation rule, “the PMSI status is lost . . . whenever the collateral purports to secure 
more than its own price. This event can occur . . . where a debt is merely refinanced or consolidated (i.e. cross-
collateralized) with other debts.” Christopher Harry, Comment, To Be (Transformed), or Not to Be: The 
Transformation Versus Dual-Status Rules for Purchase-Money Security Interests Under Kansas’ Former and 
Revised Article 9, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1095, 1105 (2002) (footnote omitted). “In contrast to the transformation 
rule, under the dual-status approach, a PMSI is not necessarily extinguished . . . .” Id. at 1107; see also G. Ray 
Warner, Consumer Avoidance of Non-Purchase-Money Security Interests Under Revised Article 9, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2001, at 22, 22. 
 205 See, e.g., Southtrust Bank of Ala., Nat’l Ass’n v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 760 F.2d 1240, 1242 
(11th Cir. 1985) (commercial context); Roberts Furniture Co. v. Pierce (In re Manuel), 507 F.2d 990, 993 (5th 
Cir. 1975) (consumer context). For a discussion of purchase-money collateral and pricing in context of 
consumers and commercial transactions, see Aronov, supra note 38, at 24; Marion W. Benfield, Jr., Consumer 
Provisions in Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1255, 1292 (1999); Gerald T. McLaughlin, “Add On” 
Clauses in Equipment Purchase Money Financing: Too Much of a Good Thing, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 
692–99 (1981); Ann E. Conaway Stilson, The “Overloaded” PMSI in Bankruptcy: A Problem in Search of A 
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collateralization was thought to prevent creditors from oppressively casting a 
net over many of a debtor’s assets in an attempt to satisfy a deficiency.206 
Thus, courts limited the “purchase money” designation to loans secured by the 
particular collateral that they financed. This restriction is reflected in Revised 
Article 9-103(b)(1), which requires that a purchase-money obligation be 
mutually traceable to an item of purchase-money collateral: “A security 
interest in goods is a purchase-money security interest . . . to the extent that the 
goods are purchase-money collateral with respect to that security interest.”207 
Whether a new vehicle can be purchase-money collateral “with respect to” 
the negative equity in the trade-in is answered squarely in Official Comment 4. 
This Comment considers the case where one item of purchase-money collateral 
(Item-1) secures the price of another item of purchase-money collateral (Item-
2), which has been sold to a buyer in the ordinary course of business.208 
Comment 4 explains that “to the extent that Item-1 secures the price of Item-2, 
[the] security interest in Item-1 would not be a purchase-money security 
interest under subsection (b)(1),” even though “Item-2 itself was subject to a 
purchase-money security interest.”209 Against this background, Revised Article 
9-103(b)(2) accommodated cross-collateralization of business inventory,210 
where requiring a rigid relationship between a particular debt and particular 
property came to be viewed as too onerous.211 However, subsection (b)(1) 
continues to deny purchase-money status to cross-collateralized obligations in 
the context of consumer goods and other types of collateral.212 
Second, in the consumer-finance context, Revised Article 9-103 preserves 
background law that provided that refinancing, consolidating, or restructuring 
an earlier loan potentially destroys its purchase-money status. Under Former 
Article 9-107, creditors frequently attempted to refinance and consolidate 
 
Resolution, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 1, 24–33 (1987); Mark B. Wessman, Purchase Money Inventory Financing: The 
Case for Limited Cross-Collateralization, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1307–13 (1990); Bernard A. Burk, Note, 
Preserving the Purchase Money Status of Refinanced or Commingled Purchase Money Debt, 35 STAN. L. REV. 
1133, 1143 & n.43 (1983). 
 206 See Stilson, supra note 205, at 24. A major benefit of claiming a purchase-money security interest over 
a wide pool of the debtor’s assets is to prevent avoidance of non-purchase-money liens under the Bankruptcy 
Code § 522(f). See Wessman, supra note 205, at 1336. 
 207 U.C.C. § 9-103(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 208 Id. § 9-103 cmt. 4. 
 209 Id. (emphasis added).  
 210 See id. § 9-103(b)(2). 
 211 For further discussion, see generally Wessman, supra note 205. 
 212 See U.C.C. § 9-103(b)(1) & cmt. 4. 
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outstanding debt in a series of separate purchase-money loans. These 
transactions often produced “the functional equivalent of cross-
collateralization” because the “[c]onsolidated debt [was] secured by all 
remaining collateral.”213 In such cases, courts found that, because each item of 
collateral secured more than its price, the resulting obligation was not for 
purchase money.214 Revised Article 9-103(f) provided that “a purchase-money 
security interest does not lose its status as such, even if . . . the purchase-money 
obligation has been renewed, refinanced, consolidated, or restructured,” but 
limited this safe harbor to “a transaction other than a consumer-goods 
transaction.”215 
The failure of Revised Article 9 to sanction “cross-collateralization, 
refinancing, or the like”216 in the consumer-goods context was the product of 
“eight years of work” and reflected “an important issue for consumer 
transactions.”217 A proposal to preserve purchase-money status in such cases 
“was left by the wayside” when a consensus did not emerge.218 Instead, a 
savings clause in subsection (h) explained that the safe harbor’s 
“limitation . . . to transactions other than consumer-goods transactions is 
intended to leave to the court the determination of the proper rules in 
consumer-goods transactions” and that “[t]he court . . . may continue to apply 
established approaches.”219 
This drafting history explains the intuition, reflected in some opinions, that 
the drafters of Revised Article 9 would not have concealed a provision 
according purchase-money status to certain refinancing transactions in Official 
Comment 3’s vague references to “expenses.” “Given that financing negative 
equity is increasingly common,” one court reasoned, “it was not an oversight 
that the legislature did not include negative equity in the list of ‘expenses 
 
 213 Wessman, supra note 205, at 1315. 
 214 Benfield, supra note 205, at 1292; Wessman, supra note 205, at 1313 n.233, 1315. Whether the 
purchase-money character of such transactions is destroyed in whole or in part depends on the jurisdiction’s 
choice among the transformation and dual-status rules. See generally In re Short, 170 B.R. 128, 132–34 
(Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1994) (reviewing each rule). 
 215 U.C.C. § 9-103(f)(3) (emphasis added). 
 216 Id. § 9-103 cmt. 7(a). 
 217 Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Consumer Compromise in Revised U.C.C. Article 9: The Shame of It All, 
68 OHIO ST. L.J. 215, 222 (2007). 
 218 Id.; see also Richard H. Nowka, Allowing Dual Status for Purchase-Money Security Interests in 
Consumer-Goods Transactions, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 13, 32–35 (2011). 
 219 U.C.C. § 9-103(h). 
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incurred in connection with acquiring rights in the collateral’ set forth in 
Official Comment 3.”220 Instead, Official Comment 3 “is silent as to existing 
debt . . . because the drafters did not intend to include that type of expense 
within the confines of the statute.”221 The battle to extend purchase-money 
status to refinanced consumer loans was waged—and lost—in the drafting of 
Revised Article 9-103. Thus, the express references to cross-collateralization 
and refinancing in Revised Article 9-103 exclude a reading of Official 
Comment 3 that would extend the purchase-money concept to these 
transactions in the consumer-goods context. Instead, the drafters “follow[ed] 
the general position that Revised Article 9 should not change present rules, 
which are seen as protective of consumers.”222 
The cross-collateralization and refinancing provisions or Revised Article 9-
103 have not yet featured prominently in the construction of the hanging 
paragraph, suggesting the foregoing interpretation may be vulnerable to 
critique. One potential counterargument is that it begs the question to 
characterize the payoff of negative equity as an instance of “cross-
collateralization, refinancing, or the like,”223 rather than as an “expense[] 
incurred in connection with acquiring rights in the collateral.”224 However, the 
former characterization is highly specific and supported by both the example in 
Official Comment 3 and the legislative history of Revised Article 9, whereas 
the “expenses incurred” language is highly general and seems to cover 
incidental expenses instead of alternative financing structures.225 Moreover, 
even if the cross-collateralization and refinancing provisions are merely clues 
to legislative meaning, they clearly reflect a background assumption that a 
purchase-money obligation could “lose its status as such” if cross-
collateralized or “renewed, refinanced, consolidated, or restructured.”226 This 
evidence hardly supports the view that a refinancing transaction that 
 
 220 In re Johnson, 380 B.R. 236, 245–46 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007) (citing In re Blakeslee, 377 B.R. 724, 728–
29 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007)); see also AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835, 
848 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 611 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2010), en banc reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 108 (2011). 
 221 In re White, 417 B.R. 102, 104 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2009). 
 222 Benfield, supra note 205, at 1294. 
 223 U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 7(a). 
 224 Id. § 9-103 cmt. 3. 
 225 See supra Part II.C. 
 226 U.C.C. § 9-103(f). 
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consolidates and cross-collateralizes two loans generates a purchase-money 
obligation. 
A second counterargument is that the provisions of Revised Article 9 
governing cross-collateralized and refinanced transactions relate only to the 
choice between the dual-status and transformation rules. To be sure, this is the 
context in which subsection (f) is generally cited.227 But the choice among 
these rules would never arise if these transactions were unambiguously 
purchase-money loans. Moreover, Official Comment 4 goes to the substance of 
the purchase-money question, providing that, except with respect to inventory, 
a “security interest in Item-1 would not be a purchase-money security interest” 
“to the extent that Item-1 secures the price of Item-2,” which has been sold to a 
buyer in the ordinary course.228 Finally, subsection (f) would still provide more 
specific evidence of legislative meaning than Official Comment 3’s oblique 
reference to “expenses incurred.” The unmistakable import of these provisions 
is that cross-collateralization and refinancing threaten the purchase-money 
status of the original debt.229 The text and legislative history of Revised Article 
9-103 therefore support the conclusion that “established approaches,”230 not 
subtle emanations from the phrase “expenses incurred,” should govern the 
treatment of over-encumbered trade-in loans. 
Unfortunately for automobile creditors, Revised Article 9’s failure to 
accord purchase-money status to cross-collateralized and refinanced consumer 
loans invites significant inconsistency among the “established approaches”231 
in different jurisdictions.232 The more severe approach, the transformation rule, 
“holds that a security interest that is part purchase-money and part non-
purchase-money completely loses its purchase-money character and is entirely 
transformed into a non-purchase-money security interest.”233 Once popular in 
 
 227 See, e.g., In re Munzberg, 388 B.R. 529, 544–45 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2008); In re Pajot, 371 B.R. 139, 158 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. GMAC v. Horne, 390 B.R. 191 (E.D. Va. 2008), 
aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part, 394 F. App’x 13 (4th Cir. 2010); U.C.C. § 9-103 cmts. 7(b) & 8. 
 228 U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 4. 
 229 See id. § 9-103 cmt. 7(b). 
 230 Id. § 9-103(h). 
 231 Id.  
 232 Wessman, supra note 205, at 1315 & n.241 (describing “a patchwork of transformation rule cases and 
dual status rule cases”). 
 233 In re Pajot, 371 B.R. 139, 157 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. GMAC v. 
Horne, 390 B.R. 191 (E.D. Va. 2008), aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part, 394 F. App’x 13 (4th Cir. 2010). 
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refinancing cases,234 the transformation rule has met widespread criticism and 
waning application.235 Courts applying the transformation rule in negative-
equity cases are frequently reversed and are clearly in the minority.236 
Moreover, local variants of Revised Article 9 exclude application of the 
transformation rule in some states. While most states restrict the subsection (f) 
safe harbors for refinancing transactions to “a transaction other than a 
consumer-goods transaction,”237 nine states protect the status of refinanced 
purchase-money obligations in the consumer-goods context as well. These nine 
states are Florida,238 Idaho,239 Indiana,240 Kansas,241 Louisiana,242 Maryland,243 
Nebraska,244 North Dakota,245 and South Dakota.246 Their version of 
subsection (f) preserves the purchase-money status of a refinanced obligation 
and compels application of the dual-status rule.247 Under the more common 
dual-status approach,248 the purchase-money character of the loan is preserved 
so long as some feasible method exists for allocating payments between the 
purchase-money and non-purchase-money components of the balance.249 In 
dual-status cases, the choice of allocation method is significant because it can 
 
 234 See, e.g., Matthews v. Transamerica Fin. Servs. (In re Matthews), 724 F.2d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 1984); 
In re Huddle, No. 06-11076-SSM, 2007 WL 2332390, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Aug. 13, 2007); see also In re 
Short, 170 B.R. 128, 133 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1994) (collecting cases). 
 235 See, e.g., Russell A. Hakes, According Purchase Money Status Proper Priority, 72 OR. L. REV. 323, 
365 (1993). 
 236 See supra text accompanying notes 79–84. 
 237 U.C.C. § 9-103(f) (2011). 
 238 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.1031(6) (West 2003). 
 239 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-9-103(f) (West, Westlaw through end of 2012 2d Regular Sess. of the 61st 
Leg.). 
 240 IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-9.1-103(f) (West, Westlaw current with all 2012 legislation). 
 241 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-103(f) (West, Westlaw through 2012 regular session). 
 242 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-103(f) (West, Westlaw through the 2011 First Extraordinary and Regular 
Sess.). 
 243 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 9-103(f) (West, Westlaw through all chapters of the 2012 Regular Sess. 
and the First and Second Special Sess. of the General Assembly). 
 244 NEB. REV. STAT. U.C.C. § 9-103(f) (West, Westlaw through the 102nd Leg. Second Regular Sess. 
(2012)). 
 245 N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 41-09-03(6) (West, Westlaw through the 2011 Regular and Special Sess. of 
the 62d Legis. Assembly). 
 246 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 57A-9-103(f) (Westlaw through the 2012 Regular Sess. and Supreme Court 
Rule 12-10). 
 247 See, e.g., Citifinancial Auto v. Hernandez-Simpson, 369 B.R. 36, 46 (D. Kan. 2007). 
 248 See supra text accompanying notes 66–78. 
 249 See, e.g., In re Acaya, 369 B.R. 564, 571 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007); In re Tuck, No. 06-10886-DHW, 
2007 WL 4365456, at *4 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Dec. 10, 2007). 
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radically alter the value of the purchase-money and non-purchase-money 
components of the balance remaining at the time of the bankruptcy filing.250 
In contrast to the prevailing emphasis on Article 9-103 and the 
accompanying Official Comment 3, reading these provisions against their 
predecessors in Former Article 9-107 helpfully directs the interpreter’s 
attention to the most relevant statutory authorities on the status of negative 
trade-in equity. In particular, it highlights the stringency of the former law’s 
definition of purchase money and the varying extent to which Revised Article 
9 relaxes these requirements. While the new provisions offer a more liberal 
regime for inventory lending and other non-consumer finance, the drafters 
were unable to agree on comparable moves with respect to consumer-goods 
transactions. Thus, the “consumer compromise” embodied in Revised Article 9 
preserves traditional approaches to consumer finance that would likely deny 
purchase-money status to a trade-in loan that refinances old debt and secures it 
with newly purchased collateral. 
III.  DUAL-STATUS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE HANGING PARAGRAPH 
If the portion of an auto loan that finances negative trade-in equity is not 
purchase money, a remaining question concerns whether, and to what extent, 
this defect deprives the loan of protection under the hanging paragraph. Courts 
in jurisdictions applying the transformation rule should have no difficulty in 
resolving this inquiry, since the transformation rule extinguishes the creditor’s 
purchase-money security interest.251 Application of the hanging paragraph 
becomes problematic, however, in the context of the dual-status rule.252 
Although every court applying a state-law dual-status rule has permitted 
bifurcation of the non-purchase-money portion of the loan under § 506, some 
of these courts have assumed that this result flows directly from the state law 
dual-status rule,253 while others have adopted it as a kind of Goldilocks 
 
 250 In re Pajot, 371 B.R. 139, 162 tbls.1 & 2 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. 
GMAC v. Horne, 390 B.R. 191 (E.D. Va. 2008), aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part, 394 F. App’x 13 (4th 
Cir. 2010). 
 251 See supra note 233. 
 252 See, e.g., In re Look, 383 B.R. 210, 220 (Bankr. D. Me. 2008). 
 253 See supra notes 66–78. 
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approach to the hanging paragraph.254 The latter authorities have reasoned that 
“the objectives of Congress in passing the hanging paragraph are best served” 
under such an approach, since it allows automobile creditors to escape 
bifurcation to the extent of their purchase-money security interest.255 Despite 
its popularity among lower courts, however, no circuit court has adopted the 
dual-status approach: in Penrod, the only circuit court decision favoring a 
debtor, the bankruptcy appellate panel’s dual-status approach was not 
examined on appeal.256 Furthermore, some courts have argued for an all-or-
nothing reading; that is, the hanging paragraph should apply to the claim either 
in its entirety or not at all.257 While there is considerable support for the view 
that a claim for even a dual-status auto loan should receive full protection from 
bifurcation, this Part concludes that the non-purchase-money component of a 
dual-status obligation is eligible for bifurcation under Code § 506. 
The textual argument for protecting a dual-status auto loan from bifurcation 
draws support from the hanging paragraph’s apparently categorical language: 
“[S]ection 506 shall not apply . . . if the creditor has a purchase money security 
interest securing the debt.”258 A few opinions have argued that this condition is 
satisfied even if the creditor’s purchase-money security interest is commingled 
with non-purchase-money interests under the dual-status rule. In one 
particularly well-articulated decision, an Illinois bankruptcy court reasoned 
that the hanging paragraph “cleaves the universe of loans into two subsets: 
those that are purchase money and those that are not,” ultimately holding that, 
“[w]here the lender advances funds used by the borrower to buy the car, the 
loan (and the security interest) is purchase money.”259 Similarly, in reasoning 
 
 254 See, e.g., AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835, 859 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
2008), aff’d, 611 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2010), en banc reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 108 (2011). 
 255 In re Hall, 400 B.R. 516, 521 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 2008). 
 256 AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158, 1160 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010), en 
banc reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 108 (2011). 
 257 Compare In re Sanders, 377 B.R. 836, 859 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007) (“The word ‘if’ implies that the 
purchase money collateral either secures the debt underlying [the] claim or it does not.”), rev’d sub nom. Ford 
Motor Credit v. Sanders (In re Sanders), 403 B.R. 435 (W.D. Tex. 2009), with In re Dale, No. H-07-3176, 
2008 WL 4287058, at *4 n.12 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2008) (holding that the hanging paragraph applies if any 
part of the creditor's claim is secured by a purchase-money security interest), aff'd on other grounds, Ford 
Motor Credit Co. v. Dale (In re Dale), 582 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 258 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006). 
 259 In re Whipple, 417 B.R. 86, 96 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2009). 
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not relied upon by the Fifth Circuit,260 the district court in In re Dale held that 
the hanging paragraph applies if any part of the loan is purchase money.261  
These opinions supply a plausible reading of the statute: even if the 
creditor’s claim was only partly secured by a purchase-money security interest 
under a state-law dual-status rule, it is still reasonable to state that such 
“creditor has a purchase money security interest securing the debt that is the 
subject of the claim.”262 While the dual-status rule normally has federal-law 
implications in the context of § 522(f), which permits avoidance of certain 
non-purchase-money liens,263 the language of the hanging paragraph is 
arguably distinguishable because it applies to—and thus protects—the entire 
“claim,” and not merely the purchase-money lien.264 
The hanging paragraph’s legislative history also poses problems for 
advocates of a dual-status approach to negative-equity loans. The earliest draft 
explicitly contemplated a dual-status approach, providing that § 506(a) “shall 
not apply to an allowed claim to the extent attributable in whole or in part to 
the purchase price of personal property acquired by the debtor within 180 days 
of the filing of the petition.”265 It further proposed that, in the case of 
commingled debt, “the amount of the allowed secured claim shall be not less 
than the unpaid principal balance of the purchase price of the personal 
property acquired,” and not the entire amount of the claim.266 This dual-status 
language later appeared in a Senate draft, S. 1301,267 alongside a competing 
formula similar to that ultimately enacted, which proposed that “section 506 
shall not apply to a claim” that is “secured . . . by reason of a lien on 
 
 260 In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 572. 
 261 In re Dale, 2008 WL 4287058, at *4 n.12; see also In re Sanders, 403 B.R. at 439. This reasoning also 
appears in Judge Bea’s dissent from the denial of rehearing in AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc. v. Penrod 
(In re Penrod), 636 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2011) (Bea, J., dissenting from the denial of en banc rehearing), 
en banc reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 108 (2011), as well as Judge 
Starzynski’s concurrence in AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc. v. Padgett (In re Padgett), 408 B.R. 374, 386 
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2009) (Starzynski, J., concurring). 
 262 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a). 
 263 Id. § 522(f)(1)(B).  
 264 See id. § 1325(a) (emphasis added). 
 265 Responsible Borrower Protection Bankruptcy Act, H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. § 110 (1997) (emphasis 
added). 
 266 Id.  
 267 Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, S. 1301, 105th Cong. § 302(c) (as reported by S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, June 4, 1998) (“[Section 506](a) shall not apply to an allowed claim to the extent attributable 
in whole or in part to the purchase price of personal property acquired by the debtor during the 90-day period 
preceding the date of filing . . . .”). 
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property.”268 Congress ultimately chose the latter course, enacting a “section 
506 shall not apply” formula described as effecting “a prohibition against 
bifurcati[on].”269 Thus, Congress considered, and abandoned, a proposal that 
would have explicitly adopted the dual-status approach. While one court has 
cautioned that “[t]here is no legislative commentary revealing the purpose of 
this substitution of concepts,”270 the abandonment of an explicit dual-status 
formula in favor of more categorical language reinforces a natural reading of 
the text. 
However, the categorical reading is not without its own problems. 
Significantly, this approach risks upsetting the usual priority schemes 
embedded in the Bankruptcy Code and Article 9.271 For example, under this 
view, a purchase-money automobile loan commingled with thousands of 
dollars in cash advances secured by the vehicle could escape bifurcation 
entirely.272 This peculiar outcome is inconsistent with the bankruptcy principle 
that “creditors of equal status should receive comparable recoveries,” which 
forbids “discrimination among unsecured creditors through classification of 
their claims.”273 More pertinently, such a reading does violence to the state-law 
principle that the first to file is first in priority, transforming the purchase-
money exception into a floodgate. In contrast, the dual-status rule comports 
well with applicable law and broader bankruptcy principles.  
As noted above, the dual-status rule is potentially at odds with the hanging 
paragraph’s language protecting the auto lender’s entire claim. Perhaps the best 
solution, then, is to invoke the rule in the debtor’s objection to the auto 
lender’s proof of claim. In In re White, the bankruptcy court sustained the 
debtors’ objection and approved a plan that simply divided the auto lender’s 
claim into secured and unsecured components, treating the balance attributable 
to the negative equity as unsecured.274 Crucially, this procedure is distinct from 
§ 506 bifurcation because it does not strip down the auto lender’s claim to the 
 
 268 Id. § 302(a). 
 269 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 17 (2005). 
 270 In re Hayes, 376 B.R. 655, 675 n.29 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007). 
 271 See In re White, 417 B.R. 102, 106 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2009). 
 272 Note that a state-law transformation rule would still preclude application of the hanging paragraph. In 
re Horn, 338 B.R. 110, 112 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2006) (debtor repeatedly refinanced her auto loan with 
additional cash advances). 
 273 See In re Steele, No. 08-40282-DML-13, 2008 WL 2486060, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 12, 2008) 
(collecting cases). 
 274 See In re White, 417 B.R. at 106–07. 
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value of the collateral—it simply excises the negative-equity component from 
the lender’s allowed secured claim. In this way, the state-law dual-status rule 
could prevent the creditor from folding a non-purchase-money security interest 
into a purchase-money claim, operating in a manner “somewhat analogous to 
claim bifurcation under § 506.”275 
A potential counterargument to this approach is that Congress has 
preempted the dual-status rule via “occupation of the field of bankruptcy claim 
determination,”276 such that “State Law deficiency claim concepts [are] wholly 
displaced by the plenary bankruptcy law standards of claim 
characterization.”277 On this view, one could argue that state-law dual-status 
rules have no role in the determination of the automobile creditor’s claim: if 
there is a right to payment and thus a claim, then “the value . . . of property to 
be distributed under the plan on account of such claim” must not be “less than 
the allowed amount of such claim.”278 Yet the hanging paragraph’s command 
that “section 506 shall not apply”279 could easily be read as giving way to 
alternative state-law schemes, so that the extent of the purchase-money 
security interest, rather than a federal claim determination, applies. Such a 
reading also avoids the potentially absurd result of withholding bifurcation of a 
claim overstuffed with non-purchase-money debts. 
The polar-opposite reading—that the hanging paragraph wholly excludes 
loans with a non-purchase-money component280—is even less persuasive. 
Some courts have held that the hanging paragraph does not apply to a dual-
status loan, reasoning that “a purchase money security interest that secures part 
of the debt” does not have “a purchase money security interest securing the 
debt,” as required by the hanging paragraph.281 Like other courts who have 
applied the hanging paragraph to the entire loan, these courts seize upon the 
 
 275 In re Pan Am Corp., 124 B.R. 960, 971 n.9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d in part, 125 B.R. 372 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 929 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 276 In re Pruitt, 401 B.R. 546, 555 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2009). 
 277 Id. at 559. 
 278 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 279 Id. § 1325(a). 
 280 The conclusion that the hanging paragraph is inapplicable to any loan with a non-purchase-money 
component is not the same as a “transformation” rule because it is “derived from . . . the Bankruptcy Code 
itself. It does not come from an interpretation of the UCC or an application of the transformation rules 
developed in state decisional law.” In re Sanders, 377 B.R. 836, 860 n.21 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007), rev’d sub 
nom. Ford Motor Credit v. Sanders (In re Sanders), 403 B.R. 435 (W.D. Tex. 2009). 
 281 Id. at 859 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)).  
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statute’s all-or-nothing phrasing, which applies “if the creditor has a purchase 
money security interest,” rather than “‘to the extent of’” such interest.282 Thus, 
they conclude, if “there is a portion of [the automobile creditor’s] claim that is 
not secured by its purchase money security interest, the claim is not the type of 
claim protected by the hanging paragraph.”283 These opinions demonstrate the 
indeterminacy that comes from a plain-meaning analysis of the hanging 
paragraph. Its categorical language seems equally suited to interpretations that 
would grant full protection, or no protection, to a dual-status loan. It is difficult 
to imagine, however, that Congress intended to penalize trade-in creditors by 
singling out their claims for bifurcation.284 Thus, as one court observed, it 
seems implausible “that any mix of non-purchase money debt [sh]ould taint the 
whole and cost the lender the protection Congress intended.”285 
The choice between full protection and a dual-status regime is a close one, 
and it is perhaps surprising that more courts have not held that the hanging 
paragraph protects the entire claim, regardless of its non-purchase-money 
contents. The dual-status interpretation is more appealing, however, because it 
protects car lenders from bifurcation to the extent of the purchase-money 
security interest, rather than assuming that Congress intended no limitations on 
the types of claims protected by the hanging paragraph.286 Furthermore, the 
careless drafting of the hanging paragraph has rightly limited some courts’ 
willingness to draw all-or-nothing conclusions from its text.287 For example, 
the bankruptcy appellate panel in Penrod reasoned, “[T]he hanging paragraph 
is not a text that lightly gives up its meaning, let alone a plain meaning, and the 
use of standard interpretive conventions is not likely to yield a canonical 
 
 282 Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)); see also In re Look, 383 B.R. 210, 220 (Bankr. D. Me. 2008); In re 
Mitchell, 379 B.R. 131, 140 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007). 
 283 In re Sanders, 377 B.R. at 860; accord In re Look, 383 B.R. at 220–21; In re Mitchell, 379 B.R. at 
140–41; In re Peaslee, 358 B.R. 545, 559 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2006), rev’d sub nom. Gen. Motors Acceptance 
Corp. v. Peaslee (In re Peaslee), 373 B.R. 252 (W.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re 
Peaslee), 585 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 284 See In re Steele, No. 08-40282-DML-13, 2008 WL 2486060, at *6 n.13 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 12, 
2008) (Even if “there is no indication that Congress intended to encourage negative equity trade-ins, neither is 
there any suggestion in the Code or legislative history that Congress intended to discourage such loans by 
penalizing their makers”). 
 285 See id. at *6; accord In re Johnson, 380 B.R. 236, 250 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007). 
 286 See In re Johnson, 380 B.R. at 249. 
 287 See supra text accompanying notes 15–24. 
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reading strong enough to support such a drastic [transformation] rule.”288 One 
might reach the same conclusion with respect to a reading that would protect 
the entire claim from bifurcation. Yet courts applying the dual-status rule may 
not need to confront these interpretive issues if, as in White, they simply treat 
the negative-equity component of each loan as a separate, non-purchase-money 
claim from the outset. 
IV.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
An obligation incurred to retire the lien on a trade-in vehicle is not 
purchase money because it is not incurred as “part of the price of the 
collateral.”289 Revised Article 9-103 permitted cross-collateralization in 
inventory financing290 and abolished the transformation rule with respect to 
refinanced obligations in the non-consumer-goods context.291 However, with 
respect to consumer goods, the law preserved the conceptual incompatibility 
between purchase money and “cross-collateralization, refinancing, or the 
like”292 and authorized courts to “continue to apply established approaches” to 
such transactions.293 Although Official Comment 3 expanded the definition of 
“price” to allow a purchase-money obligation to finance a range of incidental 
expenses,294 it did not introduce a new rule authorizing cross-collateralization 
and refinancing in the consumer context. Such proposals were advanced, and 
defeated, in the drafting of Revised Article 9.295 
Courts applying the dual-status rule to isolate a purchase-money car loan 
from its negative-equity component have held that the hanging paragraph 
protects the claim from bifurcation to the extent of the balance of the purchase-
money portion.296 This position is not without difficulties, as Congress 
seemingly protected the entire “claim” from bifurcation and rejected 
competing proposals that would have explicitly incorporated the dual-status 
 
 288 AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835, 858 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 
611 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2010), en banc reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
108 (2011); see also In re Johnson, 380 B.R. at 250. 
 289 U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(2) (2011). 
 290 Id. § 9-103(b)(2). 
 291 Id. § 9-103(f)(3). 
 292 Id. § 9-103 cmt. 7(a). 
 293 Id. § 9-103(h). 
 294 Id. § 9-103 cmt. 3. 
 295 Mooney, supra note 217, at 222. 
 296 See supra notes 66–78. 
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rule. However, one may equally surmise that Congress was not concerned with 
forcing chapter 13 debtors to repay the full balance of loans incurred—often 
more than 910 days before the bankruptcy filing—to purchase cars that they 
have since traded in. Furthermore, given the hanging paragraph’s imprecise 
drafting, interpreters should pause before reading the statute in so categorical a 
manner as to protect claims overstuffed with non-purchase-money debt.297 
Instead, the dual-status rule should allow courts to extend the hanging 
paragraph’s protection to bona fide purchase-money loans without forcing 
debtors to pay legacy debts in full to retain their vehicles over their creditors’ 
objections. 
It is ironic that Congress committed the scope of the hanging paragraph’s 
protection of “purchase money security interest[s]” to state law because 
purchase-money status has few state-law implications for car lenders.298 Since 
any after-acquired-property clause in a consumer loan becomes ineffective 
after ten days,299 an automobile creditor will not have difficulty gaining 
priority in the new vehicle, even if the lender does not have purchase-money 
status. Thus, under Article 9, “[p]urchase money status for security interests in 
consumer goods is significant only for automatic perfection . . . not for 
priority.”300 The most important consequences of the purchase-money question 
flow not from Article 9, but from the Bankruptcy Code, namely §§ 522(f) and 
1325(a).301 Along these lines, one court even held that “state law rules 
regarding the application of either the transformation rule or dual status rule 
are simply irrelevant” to the task of determining “whether [the creditor] 
qualifies for the special protection afforded . . . under the 910-day provision of 
the Bankruptcy Code, a question of federal law.”302 On the other hand, the 
hanging paragraph’s reference to “purchase money” has the appealing 
characteristic of allowing the states to contribute to the bankruptcy-law 
principles applicable to vehicle lending within their respective jurisdictions. 
 
 297 See supra notes 15–24, 287–88. 
 298 See Moringiello, supra note 36, manuscript at 1006 (arguing that purchase-money status “is 
completely irrelevant to consumer transactions” under the UCC). 
 299 U.C.C. § 9-204(b)(1) & cmt. 3. 
 300 Hakes, supra note 235, at 359–60. 
 301 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(f)(1)(B), 1325(a) (2006). 
 302 In re Sanders, 377 B.R. 836, 858 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ford Motor Credit v. 
Sanders (In re Sanders), 403 B.R. 435 (W.D. Tex. 2009). Reinterpreting the Butner principle, at least one 
commentator has argued that the hanging paragraph’s reference to “purchase money” should not be defined by 
state law. See Moringiello, supra note 36. 
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Protecting this contribution requires bankruptcy courts to sensitively interpret 
states’ differing approaches to consumer finance. Under Revised Article 9, 
these approaches are frequently less permissive than bankruptcy courts 
addressing the negative-equity issue have acknowledged. 
